12.02.2026
2025 has proven that Ukrainian energy does not break at the first blow, but every subsequent one leaves a scar. Destroyed generation facilities, damaged power transmission nodes, a deficit of complex equipment, and long manufacturing lead times…
Since September 2025, the country has endured over 2,000 missile and drone attacks, a quarter of which targeted TPPs and CHPPs, substations, and grids. The enemy’s goal is pragmatic and cynical: not so much to bring Ukraine to the brink of a total blackout, but to undermine public trust and provoke despair in society.
Despite this, the integrity of the unified energy system was maintained. This is the primary takeaway when summarizing the year.
The backbone of resilience was provided by Ukrainian nuclear generation. According to published data, “Energoatom” fulfilled its annual plan by 100.8%, providing approximately 54.1 billion kWh of electricity for the IPS (Integrated Power System).
These figures might not look like a “massive achievement” on paper, but they were reached against a backdrop of permanent shelling of energy infrastructure and continuous emergency restoration work on the grids.
Shorter repair cycles, clearer spare parts logistics, and better personnel training ensured a stable nuclear core. This allowed for maneuvering and “picking up” consumption during peaks, taking grid units out for repair, and returning them to operation with minimal pauses.
However, where the atom provided the “heart” of the energy system, its “vessels”—substations and high-voltage lines—became a major headache for energy workers. Long stabilization and emergency power outages are the result of more than just a generation deficit.
High-voltage infrastructure consists of our energy highways. If they are damaged, local networks simply cannot “pull” the load. The Odesa region case illustrates this directly: after massive December strikes, power engineers are essentially rebuilding the system from scratch.
While most consumers can be reconnected relatively quickly, the full restoration of affected substations has a horizon of one to two years. The most deficient elements are large transformers: they take 6–8 months to manufacture, and delivery queues are shared across the entire European continent.
Now, another layer of solutions is entering the game—distributed generation (DG). It was in 2025 that it finally moved from a concept and pilot projects into full practice. Municipal enterprises, private, and state-owned companies commissioned 762 MW of new gas generation; households and businesses are mass-installing SPPs and cogeneration units; communities are supplementing with thermal modules and backup boiler houses.
The government, for its part, removed some bureaucracy and allowed distribution system operators to lease state energy equipment without auctions for a symbolic fee, and resumed State Energy Supervision inspections to reduce accident rates.
In parallel, our international partners are supplying heavy kits, up to complete TPP sets, as in the case of aid from Lithuania. These are no longer “one-off miracles,” but an established multi-level logistics system of the highest complexity.
The next layer of resilience is flexibility. BESS (Battery Energy Storage Systems) have ceased to be exotic and have transformed into a separate commercial segment of the energy market.
Over the past year, approximately 534 MW of new storage capacity was commissioned. Businesses are now engaging in daily arbitrage: charging during low-price hours or from their own SPPs, and discharging into the grid during peak consumption hours. The economics are simple: the difference between electricity prices throughout the day either reduces the electricity bill (in the case of self-consumption) or generates direct income when supplying energy to the centralized grid.
But all of this works only when the “brain”—EMS (Energy Management System)—predicts prices, grid status, and generation availability every second and makes charging/discharging decisions automatically.
Therefore, we are no longer talking about “large power banks” (as BESS are perceived by the public), but about managed profitable assets. By the end of 2026, an additional 40 MW / 160 MWh of storage is planned for installation at various sites. And this is only the announced projects; the real figure will likely be much higher.
The wind energy sector also saw a revival over the past year. Currently, most Ukrainian wind farms (approx. 1.3 GW out of a total 2.3 GW) are located in temporarily occupied territories.
However, the portfolio of new investment projects already totals over 4.5 GW of capacity. A wind farm in the Mykolaiv region is being completed (total capacity will reach 500 MW), and a wind farm project in the Poltava region for 600–650 MW with a total value of over $900 million is being finalized. For energy-deficient regions, this is not just a “green image,” but a real ability to support the load.
Nevertheless, investors view risks soberly and await transparent, predictable rules. War risk insurance, a predictable long-term electricity off-take model, and the resolution of debts in the balancing market are required. Without this, cheap investment capital will not flow in.
The main constraining factors in the energy sector remain the debt pit in the balancing market and delays in implementing Euro-rules. Without solving these problems, an improvement in the investment climate will not occur.
Nevertheless, market rules are slowly but surely changing for the better. Ukraine is moving closer to European transparency standards: REMIT (Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency) and market coupling (integration of “day-ahead” markets) should make pricing cleaner and trading more predictable.
At the same time, PSO (Public Service Obligations) to support the household tariff remain a significant and, unfortunately, negative factor. Suffice it to say that “Energoatom” alone directed UAH 168.54 billion to subsidize the household tariff in 2025.
Socially, this is fully justified, especially in wartime. However, for the generation itself, supporting the household tariff has become a tangible burden that negatively impacts its investment capacity.
What does all this mean for the new 2026 energy year? There is a government estimate: in the absence of strikes, it takes about two months of painstaking daily work to restore the “no-outage” mode.
But attacks are not decreasing, and planning must be based on the worst-case scenario. Therefore, the focus is on systemic issues:
The final touch of the year is a sense of maturity. 2025 took off the rose-colored glasses and moved us out of “borrowing from the future” mode. We have learned to hold the system under fire, quickly repair nodes, and build new ones.
The energy system survived – thanks to the nuclear core, thousands of repairs, donor aid, and a wave of distributed solutions. 2026 must be the year of systemic steps: protected and redundant grids, managed storage, generation close to the consumer, and a flexible management system with predictable, transparent rules and trust.
Only in this way will survival finally turn into recovery, with a margin of stability for any winter and a prospect of modernization for years to come.
Sources:
https://espreso.tv/poglyad-dosyagnennya-ta-rozcharuvannya-v-energetichnomu-sektori-u-2025-rotsi
https://biz.liga.net/ua/all/tek/novosti/navriad-chy-tsil-blekaut-u-minenerho-vvazhaiut-shcho-rosiia-namahaietsia-kachnuty-ukrainu
https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-vidbudova/4074758-dla-povnogo-vidnovlenna-urazenih-pidstancij-na-odesini-potribno-do-dvoh-rokiv-gendirektor-dtek.html
https://delo.ua/news/energoatom-vidzvituvav-skilki-elektroenergiyi-virobili-aes-u-2025-roci-457789
https://uwea.com.ua/ua/news/entry/uvea-pdbila-pdsumki-2025-roku-v-ramkah-tematichno-preskonferenc/
https://mev.gov.ua/novyna/2025-rik-u-enerhetychniy-sferi-ukrayiny-rozvytok-rozpodilenoyi-heneratsiyi
https://100re.org.ua/pidsumky-2025-ta-priorytety-2026-klyuchovi-vysnovky-energetychnoyi-dyskusiyi-energy-club/
