27.04.2026
On April 23, 2026, the NEURC (National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission) once again raised the price limits on the electricity market. Starting May 1, a single maximum price of 15,000 UAH/MWh applies to the Day-Ahead Market (DAM) and Intraday Market (IDM), while the Balancing Market is set at 17,000 UAH/MWh.
This decision effectively cancels the approach introduced by the NEURC itself on March 31, when price caps were differentiated by time of day: for DAM/IDM — 5,600, 6,900, or 15,000 UAH/MWh, and for the Balancing Market — 6,600, 8,250, or 16,000 UAH/MWh depending on the hour.
Now, the expensive mode is essentially stretched across the entire 24-hour period. The NEURC explains this as a need for stable market operation under conditions of generation deficits and a desire to increase importers’ interest in supplying electricity.
The problem is that a price cap should serve as a safeguard, not a price benchmark. This directly follows from the NEURC Methodology: the level of price limits should influence the formation of the free market price in a minimal way. But when the market begins to live “off the ceiling,” raising that ceiling no longer restrains prices; instead, it provides them with a new, officially permitted anchor point.
This is exactly what is happening now. According to our calculations based on provided DAM data, the average price in 2025 was 5.29 thousand UAH/MWh. During the period of “high” price caps from January 17 to March 30, 2026, it jumped to 8.59 thousand UAH/MWh. After the introduction of lower differentiated ceilings from March 31 to April 22, it fell to 5.30 thousand UAH/MWh — almost returning to the 2025 average.
Furthermore, after April 16 — already amid public discussion about a new increase — the average DAM price, according to our calculations, rose by another 14%, and during night hours, the share of hours near the current ceiling jumped from 37% to 71%. While this is not yet proof of manipulation, it is certainly sufficient grounds not to automatically raise the ceiling but to investigate anomalous market behavior.
The most painful consequence of such a decision is imbalances and the balancing market. Here, a price jump instantly turns into a financial burden. In 2026, the average loss per 1 MWh of negative imbalance relative to the DAM price was 4.3 thousand UAH/MWh. For comparison: in the same period of 2025, such losses were 1.4 thousand UAH/MWh. This means that even in a comparable seasonal window, the financial blow to suppliers has already become three times stronger.
If the price ceiling is raised again, the risk of even more expensive imbalances increases automatically. This is exactly how debt accumulates. As reported by the industry publication ExPro, Ukrenergo’s debt to balancing market participants has grown to a record 30.9 billion UAH, an increase of 40% since the beginning of the year. At the same time, the debt to Ukrenergo on the balancing market is already 46.3 billion UAH, up 9.5% since the start of the year.
This is no longer a problem for individual companies, but a systemic liquidity deficit. In such a situation, higher prices on the balancing market do not improve payment discipline — they only increase the nominal debt and pull the market deeper into a settlement crisis. As early as February, the NEURC itself admitted that previous price increases on the DAM could lead to a liquidity deficit for suppliers, with the expected loss of the “provider of last resort” estimated at approximately 75 million UAH for January and 195 million UAH for January–February 2026.
The main argument regarding the allegedly critical need for a new price cap increase for the sake of imports also fails scrutiny. Commercial imports in April 2026 did not disappear even under lower hourly limits. On the contrary: from April 1–22, the average daily volume was more than double that of the same period in 2025. Moreover, after April 16, when DAM prices went up, imports did not fall but increased. In other words, the thesis that “there will be no imports without a new price cap increase” is not supported by the numbers.
Instead, something else is confirmed: raising price limits does not eliminate structural market problems; it simply makes their financial coverage more expensive. The argument about imports exists in the NEURC decision, but on its own, it does not prove the necessity of an increase on this scale.
It is not hard to see why the idea of raising price caps is so attractive to some owners of expensive peak and cogeneration units. The higher the permitted price during peak hours, the faster such projects pay off. While the development of cogeneration is necessary for the system, the accelerated payback of individual units cannot be paid for by the entire market — through more expensive DAM, costlier imbalances, larger debts, and higher bills for consumers.
The consequences of this decision extend far beyond the energy market. For suppliers, it means more working capital, greater financial security requirements, a higher risk of defaults, and a reduced ability to maintain competitive prices for clients. For the market, it means further displacement of smaller suppliers and increased concentration. For the consumer — more expensive commercial offers. For the Ukrainian economy — higher production costs, greater pressure on budgets, weaker business competitiveness, and a slower recovery.
The conclusion is simple: the NEURC has once again chosen the simplest and most expensive tool for the market — raising the price ceiling. Instead, the regulator should focus on three things: investigating anomalous price behavior on the DAM, a real revision of the imbalance mechanism, and targeted anti-crisis solutions for imports and generation that do not shift systemic market problems onto suppliers and consumers. Raising the price ceiling in a situation where the market is already living “off the ceiling” means not stabilizing the market, but simply legalizing more expensive electricity.
