07.08.2026
Navigating EU–Ukraine Market Coupling: GOs, CBAM, and the Challenge of Negative Prices
According to an analysis by Green Deal Ukraine, in late 2025–early 2026, inefficient trade due to a lack of market integration resulted in annual profit losses in Ukraine exceeding EUR500 million.
The adoption of the Law of Ukraine No. 4834-IX dated 7 April 2026 (“Law on Market Coupling”) marks Ukraine’s transition from physical synchronisation with Europe to full market integration. The implementation of market coupling systems (SDAC and SIDC) will fundamentally change the architecture of the Ukrainian energy market, transforming it into an integral part of the European economic space. Given the scope of the Law on Market Coupling’s final and transitional provisions, Ukraine faces a colossal amount of regulatory work to fully implement European regulations. According to the Law on Market Coupling, the actual launch of the integrated day-ahead (SDAC) and intraday (SIDC) markets will take place only after the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission (NEURC) approves a report on the readiness of the market infrastructure and financial settlement systems.
The implementation of the new market structure brings several ambiguities regarding future regulatory changes. Market stakeholders are particularly concerned about the very real prospect of negative electricity spot prices, the lack of a CBAM exemption for Ukraine, and the potential non-recognition of Ukrainian guarantees of origin (GOs) for renewable electricity.
1. Legal and regulatory dimension
The Law of Ukraine on Market Coupling, as of 1 May 2027, abolishes the NEURC’s authority to set price caps on the market. The NEURC’s powers to impose price caps on the day-ahead market (DAM), intra-day market (IDM) could temporarily apply in the period from 1 May 2027 until the launch of single market coupling only during a state of emergency in the Integrated Power System of Ukraine (IPS), for a period of up to 90 days, taking into account prices on adjacent European markets, and such measures must not restrict electricity imports/exports. A separate regulation is introduced for technical price limits that may be applied during balancing operations and by NEMO, provided they are harmonised with other NEMOs.
Abolishing price caps will naturally lead to electricity pricing driven purely by market signals. It means that when there is a surplus of electricity, the market will experience negative prices. This practice, expected in Ukraine, is far from unprecedented. For instance, the EU market has historically experienced widespread negative pricing in the intraday market and in 2024, on the day-ahead market.
2. Tax dimension
There are three potential ways in which transactions with negative prices may be treated from the VAT perspective:
The Tax Code of Ukraine enables the sale of electricity at a price below zero if the price was determined in the independent electricity market, without self-assessment of output VAT or a reverse charge for the seller.
We may not exclude the possibility that the State Tax Service may use the green tariff as a market-level benchmark for the accrual of additional output VAT for the seller. This may cause disputes with the tax authorities. In this case, the off-taker does not recognise input VAT for the goods received, as he has not made any VAT payment on his side.
In this case, the safest approach for the Ukrainian taxpayers may be to recognise input VAT for the seller and recognise output VAT for the off-taker.
In this case, there will be two different tax bases for the VAT: (x) tax base for the electricity price (i.e. minimum base price); and (y) tax base for the service of stimulating consumption of the electric energy (plus minimum base price).
In terms of the (x) tax base, the off-taker must recognise input VAT and the seller must recognise output VAT. In terms of the (y) tax base, the seller must recognise input VAT, and the off-taker must recognise output VAT.
We have seen a possibility for such an approach based on our market insight. We understand that there are proposals from key stakeholders regarding treating supply with negative prices as a provision of service, at least at the level of the applicable bylaws. This may shed light on the tax treatment as well.
Anyways, additional clarity is needed at the level of applicable laws. Alternatively, taxpayers may clarify this issue with the State Tax Service of Ukraine by obtaining an individual tax ruling. We would not exclude the possibility of a future court dispute with the State Tax Service of Ukraine due to the lack of clarity about the individual tax ruling obtained.
Corporate Income Tax in Ukraine applies to a financial result calculated in accordance with accounting rules, as adjusted by the Tax Code of Ukraine.
Based on the treatment of transactions between the seller and the off-taker, various accounting treatments may be applicable, depending on the management’s decision for the respective company:
For the purchaser (off-taker), the accounting results depend heavily on the off-taker’s subsequent actions with the electricity obtained (immediate resale, storage, utilising or remote resale). In general, the purchaser must recognise cash received from the seller and the market price of the obtained electricity as his negative future COGS for such goods. Meaning that income must be recognised upon the sale of electricity to the third party. There may be a position where only cash paid by the seller is included in the off-taker’s negative COGS. From our standpoint, recognition of cash as part of negative future COGS without recognising the negative COGS for the market price of the produced electricity may lead to litigation with the tax authority and a potential loss in court for the taxpayer.
In the case of the sale of services, the seller may recognise COGS as a deductible expense upon the transfer of electricity under the negative price. Services provided by the off-taker may, in turn, be recognised as a deductible expense of the seller.
The off-taker must recognise cash received from the seller as income for the provided service. Future COGS in this case is zero for the off-taker.
We may not exclude a dispute with the State Tax Service of Ukraine, stating that COGS was recognised as an expense without proper accounting treatment, taking into account the letter of the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine mentioned before. This risk may be particularly relevant for companies using Ukrainian national accounting standards.
In this case, the seller may recognise a loss (if any) equal to the difference between the COGS of electricity and the sale price under the minimum base price (received from the off-taker) as a deductible expense. The seller may recognise the price of services paid to the off-taker as a deductible expense.
The off-taker may recognise future COGS for the electricity in the amount of the paid base minimum price. Cash received from the seller must be recognised as income for the provided service.
We may not exclude the possibility that amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine will be made to clarify the Corporate Income Tax position for the sale of electricity at negative prices. An individual tax ruling is also advised for this case.
Anyways, more clarity at the level of law would be of the great benefit for the market. Individual tax ruling is still advisable for excise tax.
Absent an EU carbon tax derogation or a domestic Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), upcoming CBAM regulations risk making Ukrainian electricity exports financially uncompetitive.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is the EU’s tool to put a fair price on carbon emitted during the production of carbon-intensive goods that are entering the EU, and to encourage cleaner industrial production in non-EU countries. Also, CBAM aligns carbon costs with the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). CBAM currently covers six carbon-intensive sectors: aluminium, cement, iron and steel, fertilisers, electricity, and hydrogen.
From 1 January 2026, importers must pay for the embedded emissions of covered imports, following the end of the transitional period (2023-2025). By pricing embedded emissions, CBAM increases the effective cost of exporting carbon-intensive products to the EU for non-EU producers, including Ukraine.
Article 30(7) contains an explicit force majeure clause allowing the EC to provide provisional measures to address exceptional circumstances where “an exceptional and unprovoked event has destructive consequences on the economic and industrial infrastructure of such country”. Given the exceptional wartime circumstances in Ukraine, the government should examine whether the conditions for invoking this provision are met and, if so, pursue it through the European Ukrainian political dialogue. Alternatively, Ukraine could explore the case for a political commitment from EC to recycle CBAM revenues collected on Ukrainian exports back into reconstruction and decarbonisation of the Ukrainian industry.
The alternative to saving money in Ukraine and avoiding CBAM obligations is the establishment of a national emissions trading system (ETS), a “cap-and-trade” mechanism under which the state sets a cap on covered greenhouse gas emissions, while companies must surrender allowances for their actual emissions. Domestic ETS is important because, under CBAM rules, a carbon price effectively paid in the country of origin – including through a domestic ETS – may be deducted from the CBAM obligation, provided that such payment is duly documented and recognised for CBAM purposes.
Ukraine has already taken preparatory steps towards establishing a domestic ETS. In February 2025, the government approved an action plan for the creation of a national greenhouse gas ETS, which envisages a preparatory phase in 2025–2027, a pilot launch from 2028, and a full operational phase no earlier than three years after the termination of martial law.
On 7 July 2026, the Ukrainian Parliament registered the draft law “On the Principles of Functioning of the National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System” (“Draft Law”). The Draft Law aims to establish the legal, institutional, and economic framework for the national system transposing Directive 2003/87/EC with the aim of addressing CBAM-related competitiveness risks. According to the explanatory note, the Draft Law provides for a smooth introduction of the Ukrainian ETS within several stages. Also, the Draft Law defines the legal, institutional, organisational, and economic foundations of the ETS’s operations.
Although the Draft Law strengthens Ukraine’s pathway towards EU-aligned carbon pricing, it does not address the timing gap, which arises when the CBAM has been valid and obligatory, i.e. since 1 January 2026. At the same time, Ukraine’s ETS remains subject to parliamentary adoption, secondary legislation, and staged implementation, and is expected to become fully operational no earlier than three years after the termination or cancellation of martial law.
Unless Ukraine secures a CBAM derogation or establishes a recognised domestic ETS, CBAM may materially reduce the commercial competitiveness of Ukrainian electricity exports to the EU.
Currently, the GOs issued in Ukraine by the NEURC are not recognised for cross-border trading. This leads to inefficiency of market coupling, preventing participants from realising the full commercial and environmental value of cross-border capacity. Ukraine launched its national registry of GOs controlled by NEURC in 2024, issuing over 21 million GOs domestically. At the same time, for the full integration of Ukrainian GOs into cross-border trade, the following is required.
Once these steps are complete, recognised Ukrainian GOs will function as a vital tool to shield industrial exports from heavy CBAM financial obligations by officially proving the use of zero-carbon electricity.
[1] Letter No. 8118/7/23-6217 dated 22.05.2003
[2] Letter No. 31-04220-29-18/1497 dated 02.09.2003