Інституційна пам’ять енергетики: погляд ексміністрів на реформу НКРЕКП та межі незалежності Регулятора

Ukraine stands on the threshold of another reset of the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission (NEURC). Legislative initiatives (No. 14282 and No. 14282-1) propose fundamentally different approaches: ranging from a complete rotation and the involvement of international experts with a decisive vote to strengthening parliamentary oversight. However, the history of relations between the Ministry of Energy and the Regulator has always been tense, regardless of the individuals in office.

Energy Club is bringing together a unique lineup of speakers — former heads of the Ministry of Energy from various periods. These are the people who directly shaped state policy and faced the ultimate dilemma: how to ensure the implementation of government strategy without crossing the line into interfering with the activities of an independent arbiter.

We aim to go beyond merely discussing the text of draft laws and delve into realpolitik. Is absolute regulatory independence possible amidst war and crisis? Where is the line between a state-oriented position and political pressure? And how can we avoid the mistakes of the past to prevent reform from becoming just another rotation of loyal personnel?

This is a conversation about institutional stability, past errors, and safeguards for the future.

Discussion Points:

The Myth of Independence: An analysis of the real, rather than declarative, autonomy of NEURC from the Government and the Office of the President. Is full independence of the Regulator possible within Ukraine’s current political realities?
“Telephone Law” vs. State Policy: Where is the boundary between the necessary coordination of strategies (the Ministry forms policy — the Regulator implements it) and direct executive interference in the work of an independent body?
Risks of the Current Reform (Draft Laws No. 14282/14282-1): Is the full rotation of Commission members an effective cleaning tool or a dangerous precedent that makes any future composition of the Regulator “pliable”?
The International Partners Factor: Granting international experts a decisive vote in the selection of NEURC members: a loss of energy sovereignty or the only chance to break the cycle of political corruption?
The “Tariff Trap” and Populism: The role of NEURC as a “lightning rod” for unpopular decisions. How can we build a system for making economically sound decisions that are independent of electoral cycles?

Institutional Safeguards: Which legislative changes are critically needed right now to avoid the necessity of another “reset” of the Regulator in a few years?