10.02.2026
Energy Club Vice President Ivan Grygoruk analyzed the current state of the power system following a series of massive missile and drone strikes. In his commentary, the expert explained the difference between systemic failures and a total blackout, revealed the role of Russian civilian power engineers in planning the attacks, and assessed the real prospects for implementing distributed generation in Ukrainian cities.
We invite you to watch the video recording of the conversation and read the full text transcript of the expert’s key points.
Host: Ukraine continues to eliminate the consequences of two massive missile and drone attacks on the power system this week. The situation remains difficult, reports Ukrenergo. The level of power deficit and damage still does not allow for the cancellation of emergency blackouts in most regions, although in some areas, the volume of restrictions today is lower. However, nuclear generation is still partially offloaded.
On the eve, the Russians attacked energy facilities in eight regions, including the Burshtyn TPP in the Ivano-Frankivsk region and the Dobrotvir TPP in the Lviv region. The city of Burshtyn was left without heat and water. The enemy also struck the largest electrical substation in Europe — the “Zakhidnoukrainska” (750 kV) in the Lviv region, which regulates the power supply to the western regions and ensures imports from the EU.
A major accident last week led to cascading outages. Joining us is Ivan Grygoruk, Vice President of Energy Club. Mr. Ivan, welcome!
Ivan Grygoruk, Vice President of Energy Club: Greetings to the studio, greetings to the viewers. Thank you for the invitation.
Host: The event that occurred a week ago — is it a one-time failure or an alarm signal that such cases will be systemic in the future?
Ivan Grygoruk: It is very appropriate that you called it a “failure” and not a blackout. We need to dot the “i’s”: a blackout is a complete collapse of the integrated power system with subsequent massive de-energization. A systemic failure is something else.
Yes, our power system has been suffering from constant shelling since 2022. Equipment is degrading, reliability is reduced, but the system still has a significant margin of resilience. The enemy hits not only generation but also the transmission and distribution system, the gas transportation system, and combined heat and power plants. Their main goal is the civilian population and life-support infrastructure (heat, water), not military facilities.
Systemic failures are possible; it all depends on the intensity of the shelling. The enemy acts systematically because behind this is the professional modeling of enemy strikes. This is the work not of the military, but of Russian civilian power engineers. They have specific knowledge and software that allows them to model strikes on the energy system and their consequences, including heat and water supply to cities.
About 80% of the planning for such attacks is the work of civilian power engineers of the RF. The military performs only up to 20% of the work: choosing the time, means of destruction, and taking into account the capabilities of our air defense.
But I believe it will not come to a total blackout. Restoration is ongoing continuously. Currently, over 50,000 specialists are working on this, plus the State Emergency Service and utility services. Even today, we already see a certain improvement in the situation.
Host: These attacks exposed the problem of centralization. Previously, it was convenient: one CHP heats half a city. But if it is put out of action, the system falls apart. Is centralization our weak point?
Ivan Grygoruk: Large cities cannot completely abandon the centralized system. Distributed generation (not to be confused with decentralization) is much more expensive and requires the possibility of creating thousands of new connection points and capacity output.
Take the example of Kyiv, which consumes conditional 1.5 GW (that’s like one and a half nuclear blocks). To replace such a volume with distributed generation, for example, with 20 MW electrical units, we would need at least 1,500 such units. This requires a colossal number of connections to gas, electricity networks, water supply, and heating networks. It is almost impossible to completely replace the main consumption in this way.
But I agree that after the war, for large vulnerable cities, approaches need to be changed. The reliability criterion “N-2” should be introduced. This means having a guaranteed reserve of capacity along with networks that can replace the work of large generation in case of accidents or military destruction.
It is important to understand: this should be a reserve, not constant operation. Small units are usually not designed to operate in an 8,000-hour-per-year mode (base load). Their resource is 1,000–3,000 hours, which means seasonal work or emergency replacement of a deficit.
People are already saving themselves. According to the statistics of only one manufacturer of household charging stations (storage units), Ukrainians bought them for a total capacity of 3 GW. This is the conditional equivalent of three nuclear blocks! Purchases are made primarily by household consumers and businesses.
So yes, we need to introduce a guaranteed reserve based on the “N-2” principle, and this applies not only to generation but also to capacity output schemes — in electrical and heating networks.
Host: Mr. Ivan, thank you for the clarification! Ivan Grygoruk, Vice President of Energy Club, was with us.
