15.01.2026
The intensity of air strikes on Ukrainian energy system facilities is not subsiding. In December 2025 alone, the aggressor attacked generation and distribution networks in the capital region, Odesa and its region, and regions in central Ukraine.
Unfortunately, for most consumers today, a “stable grid” does not mean the absence of power outages. It merely implies less depth and duration, predictable schedules, and priorities that society understands.
Massive attacks have not disappeared. However, we can ensure that each subsequent strike causes less chaos and that restoration takes days or weeks rather than months.
Thousands of medium-voltage substations with capacities of up to 35 kW operate in Ukraine. According to the Ministry of Energy, there are about 3,500 such facilities. Clearly, building fortifications and providing air defense protection for all of them is physically impossible. This is not a lack of will, but the real limits of resources and time.
Therefore, the logic must be simple: first and foremost, we “armor” about a hundred key high-voltage nodes of the Ukrenergo transmission network against attacks, as these power entire regions and large cities. For others, we rely on operational repairs, backup schemes, and mobile solutions. We must achieve maximum effect from every hryvnia and man-hour.
The algorithm is simple: in the first 4–5 days after an attack, emergency work is carried out on the grid to restore at least minimal power. Next comes a longer but critical stage lasting 10–12 weeks: replacement of transformers, switches, switching equipment, and restoration of high-voltage lines and substations.
This is where time and “hardware” are currently lacking. Manufacturing large equipment takes months, and repair crews work under the risk of repeated strikes. Therefore, speed is influenced not only by money but also by logistics, safety, and the availability of reserves.
National stockpiles of reserve equipment were created, but the current intensity of shelling “eats” them up in a matter of months. At the same time, regional energy companies have even smaller stocks.
As a result, the pace of planned restoration is falling: where yesterday it was simply “remove and replace,” tomorrow we will have to wait for equipment to be manufactured or repair damaged units. This poses a direct risk to the duration of outages during the winter period.
This is particularly noticeable in the example of Kyiv, which consumes 1.5–2 GW. Meanwhile, the capital’s own capacities are sufficient for barely a quarter of the daily need—the rest of the electricity comes from the unified energy system via high-voltage lines and nodal substations.
When these corridors are damaged, local networks do not just “choke”; they are unable to ensure the transmission of the required volumes of energy. That is why the capital “enjoys” 2–4 queues of stabilization outages, and consumers remain without electricity for 12–16 hours a day.
In such a situation, one must realize that there will be no “miracle tomorrow.” There will be a slow reduction in the depth of outages as the main nodes are restored.
The first thing to do is to fairly redistribute the available resource. Lists of critical facilities must be honest. When “pseudo-critical” businesses or institutions end up on the list, household consumers face deeper scheduled hourly outages.
A transparent review and a unified principle for inclusion in the critical list is what realistically improves the situation and reduces imbalances without additional megawatts. The Government is already actively working on this, which is to be welcomed.
Distributed generation is not a trendy term, but a real shield for communities. Almost 700 units of heat supply equipment have already been delivered.
According to the Government, a program to install 60 distributed generation facilities with the support of international partners is already being launched. Specifically, this involves the installation of:
The priority is medical infrastructure, water utilities, and heat supply hubs. Cogeneration covers both heat and electricity, reducing the need to “pull” megawatts through damaged “energy corridors.”
In parallel, private energy from RES (Renewable Energy Sources) is growing. Over three quarters of 2025, more than 2 GW of solar panels were imported. The market has shifted from “panic” to economics: businesses and households are calculating payback periods and installing hybrid solar power plants with batteries. Imports of energy storage systems are also growing.
But there is a flip side: a significant part of this generation remains outside the metering system; the dispatcher does not see it in real-time, and as a result, demand forecasting becomes more complicated. Therefore, the task for now is to integrate this capacity into the system. To do this, several steps need to be taken:
Based on the above, an approximate action plan for normalizing the energy system’s operation can be drawn up.
In the short term (up to 30 days), work on the main power transmission lines and nodal high-voltage substations needs to be completed. That is, where a single equipment replacement or repair ensures light for entire regions. In other places, mobile substations are installed, and the first cogeneration units are connected in the “black holes” of the grid. At the same time, the review of the critical infrastructure list continues, removing everything “superfluous.” At all stages, we ensure the safety of repair crews—because without people, no transformer will work.
In the next 1–3 months, the program of 60 distributed generation facilities, already agreed upon with partners, should be scaled up. It is critically important to replenish stocks of equipment and spare parts so as not to wait months for small but critical details. Plus, simple and transparent controlled consumption programs for business need to be launched: those who can shift their load from evening peaks receive compensation.
In the 3–12 month perspective, internal “West-Center-East” intersections need to be strengthened so that imports and own generation reach where they are lacking. Mass installation of smart meters and connection of simple digital services for accounting and load management is required. It is also important to accelerate the integration of corporate solar power plants and energy storage systems into the general metering and dispatching system. Additionally, where possible, we need to start placing the most vulnerable nodes underground to enhance the security of energy facilities.
Progress can be checked by getting answers to simple questions:
We cannot fully protect every substation, every power line tower, every switch, and every meter of transmission line. But even now, we can choose the “right” nodes where one step returns light to hundreds of thousands of people.
We can quickly connect local generation where the grid is “thinnest.” We can ensure that private energy works together with the system, not parallel to it. And we can protect those who bring the electricity back—our repair crews.
Stability is discipline and clear priorities. Less hype, more megawatts in the right places and at the right hours. This is exactly how grid reliability returns, even under attack.
