29.09.2025
Valerii Bezus, an expert in energy transformation and former head of the State Agency on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving of Ukraine, is convinced that the main problem in Ukrainian energy is not a lack of resources, but a lack of strategic management. In a conversation with “EnergoBusiness,” he explains why supervisory boards have not met expectations, why blindly copying European models doesn’t work, and why the country must learn to defend its own interests in EU energy policy.
— My first question for you is a traditional one: How is Ukraine preparing for winter amidst Russian aggression against our energy sector? We see problems with gas, with loans for its purchase, and with the electricity sector. How do you see the situation? Is it a challenge, or rather a chance to talk about energy efficiency?
— To be honest, every time we talk about energy, I would start with energy efficiency. In the public consciousness, it is often reduced to light bulbs or superficial building insulation. In reality, it is the cornerstone of the entire energy sector, its historical foundation. And when we analyze any crisis or transformation, we always come back to efficiency. This is an incredibly deep issue.
And in the context of preparing for winter, it is also key. We have been living under full-scale war for several years now, and virtually the entire energy system is operating in crisis mode. There are established mechanisms for risk assessment, protection, and response. But there are no illusions: we have seen almost everything. There is technical obsolescence, accumulated problems from reforms and non-reforms, and a broken logic of energy management. All of this leads to an inefficient energy sector and an energy-inefficient economy for our state.
— What do you mean by “broken logic of reforms”?
— Look: from the very beginning, the reforms were desynchronized. First, they started with the gas market, then launched a new electricity market, passed a law, and changed the model. But at the same time, they forgot, among other things, about thermal energy, water supply, and sanitation—critically important infrastructure segments. They decided that “it would somehow work out.” The result was chaos, where some sectors are somewhat reformed, others are not, and there is still no single, systemic, strategic logic.
So today, the problems that were postponed back then are catching up with us. And this applies not only to the technical side but also to the social side—protecting people from energy poverty. In civilized countries, there are systems of targeted support, while we are still discussing surrogate mechanisms like the same PSO (Public Service Obligation), which ultimately protect no one and only cause destruction.
— On top of this, there are direct threats from the war…
— Yes. We are dealing with constant attacks—both physical and cyber. Added to this is the climate factor: sharp temperature drops, unpredictable weather fluctuations, and surface geological processes. This puts additional pressure on an already worn-out engineering infrastructure. Plus, there are historical problems of urban construction and uncontrolled development.
All of this together creates a huge challenge.
But most importantly, we have been accustomed to living in a crisis, transitional mode for too long. However, this is our new reality. And it is in this reality that we need to build systemic policy and high-quality reforms.
— We often think, “Well, we’ll get through the winter somehow, and then we’ll see.” Is this the right approach?
— In fact, we need to admit: this is our life now. We work in crisis conditions every year, and it is time to look for systemic solutions. The enemy will certainly not stop its attacks—we see the trends. The risks are clear: drone strikes, missiles, cyberattacks. The scale may vary, but to say that anything can “surprise” us—not anymore. We have already seen an attack of 800+ drones in a single day, and for Russia, this is not a problem. If weather conditions favorable to the enemy also align, large-scale attacks on the energy infrastructure are practically guaranteed. So, frankly, this winter is likely to be even harder than the previous ones.
— You’ve listed a whole range of problems. How would you prioritize them? What is most important?
— You can count by money, by investment, or by the scale of losses. But I would single out something that is rarely talked about. It’s the management factor.
We are used to talking about material resources and technical conditions, but we forget that all decisions are made by specific people, specific management institutions. And the load on the management system—state, local, and business—is now colossal. This, in my opinion, is the most important challenge. Because we can have the right ideas, but if the management can’t cope, smart solutions remain only on paper.
And today we have reached a critical point. In public administration, there is a systemic personnel crisis. Local self-government has long lacked professional people capable of effectively managing infrastructure. In business, it’s the same problem, perhaps even bigger because it’s more hidden. So it turns out that “field” personnel are under pressure from the blows of war, and managers are under the pressure of responsibility. And in many places, this system is already “breaking.”
— Why did this happen? What is the root of the personnel problem?
— There are several factors here. First, war and terrorism take our people—some die, some are forced to leave. Second, for at least 20 years, we have lost the school of personnel training. The system of education and practical training for management specialists in energy and infrastructure has been destroyed.
Instead, we see strange career jumps: people with no experience make “vertical careers,” while real knowledge and practical experience are almost completely devalued. The mechanisms for transferring knowledge from older generations have also been destroyed; sometimes it even seems that the culture of respect for experience has been lost.
Yes, we have a national phenomenon of extraordinary crisis self-organization. We are truly capable of mobilizing at critical moments. But you can’t get far on that. This resource is being depleted. And if a few years ago we could rely on the spontaneous mobilization of people, today institutional solutions are needed.
Therefore, I would advise: before this winter and the next, to reassess not only material and financial resources but also organizational and managerial ones. Because it is here that we are on the brink.
— You talk about a personnel crisis. Do you see a primary step that could change the situation? Should it be a legislative initiative? A presidential decision? Or perhaps another mechanism for public administration and business?
— Most of the problems are common to both the public and private sectors. They are interconnected because it is a common labor market. And everywhere there is a lack of strategy. Professionals need to be given a perspective—an understanding that they are needed here, in Ukraine, and not abroad. These signals should come, first and foremost, from the state, but corporations must also play a significant role.
In the public sector, the crisis has been going on for years. The critical phase was during the COVID-19 era when civil service competitions were canceled—even in the imperfect form they existed. Professional criteria have now been virtually destroyed. In the private sector, the situation is slightly different: it holds on to the still available, but degrading, resource, which is already exhausted by years of pressure from war and crises.
Separately, we need to talk about engineering personnel. This is already a potential catastrophe for the state’s development. Mobilization processes also play their role, knocking experienced, highly qualified specialists out of the economy, and young people are not eager to go en masse to study engineering. As a result, we have a huge imbalance in the supply of specialists.
— And is it the same problem at the management level?
— Absolutely. A high-quality manager with experience in, for example, renewable energy can easily find a job abroad. It’s enough to learn the language—and Germany, Poland, or another country opens its doors to them. This is a global market that is developing dynamically. And we are losing people and development prospects.
— Can we say that the underdeveloped nature of Ukrainian energy markets and the constant “temporariness” of reforms only push people to leave?
— Exactly. Our markets are in a permanent process of “under-reform” that never ends. This affects both the outflow of personnel and weak business and investment activity. In turn, this reinforces the opposite effect—even worse quality of public administration and reforms. Look at the latest bills in the energy sector. Each new document is presented as a “comprehensive solution,” but when you read the conclusions of the Parliament’s Main Expert Directorate, it becomes clear: there are plenty of gaps. Moreover, we often forget about the agency of management—about those who will implement these decisions.
As a result, the private sector looks at the “state,” the “state” looks at business, and no one takes real responsibility for the country’s development. Some decisions are made formally, on paper, and some are not formalized at all. And then the quality depends on specific managers, their will, and their competencies. It is important to understand that public administration is a two-way process, which in the economic sphere depends on the position of both the authorities and business.
The main thing is that we already have a critical, though not obvious to everyone, deficit of high-quality, experienced managers. The general crisis background overshadows the crisis in the quality of management decisions. The post-Soviet personnel reserve has long been exhausted, and a new training system has not been created. And now, in a time of crisis, we are reaping the consequences in this dimension as well.
— And this applies to both the state and business?
— Yes. In the public sector, of course, it is even more difficult. Because today, either very great idealists, ready to fight against all odds, can work there, or outright cynics who are looking exclusively for personal material gain. The balance, or rather the clear imbalance between these two extremes, determines the quality of management today. Business has its own challenges, and on the whole, the situation is no better, but at least there are simpler incentives there. However, the overall pool of quality specialists is definitely not increasing.
— Once, great hopes were placed on supervisory boards: they said, we will implement the European mechanism and get better management of state-owned companies. But the results, to put it mildly, are disappointing. According to some experts, like Oleksiy Yuriyovych Kucherenko, it was a complete failure. Why didn’t this tool work? Can it be reconfigured, or should we invent something new?
— The idea of supervisory boards really sparked enthusiasm, especially among the activist community, which typically does not delve into substantive details due to a simple lack of knowledge and experience. It seemed: let’s introduce Western models, and they will automatically yield results. But reality turned out to be more complicated. Because a superficial model in itself does not guarantee success. It works only where there is a culture of institutions, a balance of interests, and stable control mechanisms. It cannot be turned into a mere cargo cult with expectations of automatic results.
In Ukraine, supervisory boards have often turned into either decorative bodies or a platform for additional conflicts. Sometimes they even created more problems than they solved. The reason is simple: we lack a professional approach, and there is only fragmentary copying and imitation of foreign tools.
— So the problem is not in the model itself, but in the Ukrainian interpretation?
— Exactly. We Ukrainians seem to have a specific trait: we learn, at best, from our own mistakes. And this evolutionary process takes too much time, which we simply don’t have in conditions of war and crisis.
We should not idealize the “European framework” but understand that it works only when society and the state acquire their own agency. We often limit ourselves to slogans: “Let’s pass the law quickly, check the box, report to the donor, and figure it out later.” Such an approach substitutes the essence.
— You mentioned agency. Does it mean that substantive reforms in Ukraine are mostly a nominal synchronization with European processes rather than our conscious internal choice?
— Absolutely. Yes, there is a fundamental choice of a European development vector, we adopt European models, but we do not always understand how they work in a broad context and in accordance with national interests. Pan-European instruments also have their problems, but they are constantly being improved. And we have only a copy without substance, and with a significant lag. So, on the one hand, it’s good that we are moving in the same direction as the EU. But on the other hand, there is a lack of internal understanding and a conscious demand from society for substantive reforms.
— This is clearly visible in the example of the energy sector. European partners insist on decarbonization, but is there a real demand for it among Ukrainians?
— That’s an interesting question. If you were to conduct an honest survey, I am not sure that the majority of citizens would put “decarbonization” among their top priorities. At the top of the list would be a strong army, a strong economy, jobs, and social stability. Clean energy would come after all that.
And that’s normal: people’s priorities are based on their practical needs. Therefore, it is important to explain and argue why this same decarbonization is important, how it is related to security, investment, and economic prospects. Not through slogans, “checkmarks,” and photo reports from events, but through an open and high-quality discussion.
Because reforms that happen only “for donors” are not viable. But when there is a public demand, then they get a chance for success and public support. People must feel that these are not abstract directives from Brussels, but a concrete path to energy independence and a higher quality of life.
— Perhaps in relations with the EU, we should set more realistic goals? After all, we understand that our state institutions, managerial staff, and society are not where Germany’s or France’s are. Relatively speaking, Ukrainians will not install solar panels on every balcony at the same pace as in Berlin. So, should we honestly admit: we are moving along the same path, but at a different speed?
— Of course. We must be aware of our own capabilities and pace. This does not mean that we are lagging behind; it means that we are moving at our own rhythm, taking into account the reality of our economy and society.
And here’s what’s important: European integration is not just about signing agreements and “joining” directives. It is a constant dialogue. We are not a passive party that only executes. We must be an active participant who negotiates, defends its interests, and secures conditions for the development of national business and the economy.
— But do we have enough agency in these negotiations? Doesn’t it seem like we often just sign what is brought to us?
— Unfortunately, that is true. Often our delegations play a more formal role. But we must learn to negotiate on equal terms. Because even from the EU’s perspective, our national interests should sound convincing.
An example is nuclear energy. The EU already recognizes it as decarbonized. If so, then Ukraine has one of the cleanest electricity mixes in Europe. So why do we still feel “second-rate” in shaping our own course? We need to determine for ourselves: which energy sources, which technologies work for the national economy. And ask the question directly: are we building a competitive energy sector for Ukraine’s development, or are we just financing foreign demands and foreign producers?
— So, you’re talking about getting rid of the “student” complex and starting to act as an equal partner?
— Exactly. We have our own potential, our own resources, and our own strengths. And we must think in these terms. Not to turn energy decisions into activist campaigns or political slogans, but to analyze professionally and strategically what works for the national economy at each stage of our development.
Because ultimately, energy is indeed our front. Without an effective and competitive energy sector, we will not rebuild the economy, and without a strong economy, we will not have a strong army and military-industrial complex. These things are interconnected.
— Then it turns out that the key is in professional discussion?
— Undoubtedly. I believe that without debate, without open professional discussion, we cannot move forward. No expert, no matter how educated, has a monopoly on the truth. There must be space for discussion, for the clash of ideas. This is a natural process of development.
And look at our neighbors. Have you ever heard a prominent politician in Poland categorically call for, say, an immediate abandonment of coal generation? No. They debate, seek a balance, and transition gradually. In our country, any word about abandoning or developing a particular technology immediately turns into slogans. This is dangerous. We need a sober, professional conversation about the future of energy.
So I emphasize: we can talk for a long time about debts in the energy sector or the crisis, but without high-quality systemic management decisions, we will find ourselves again and again in a situation where problems accumulate, and the reaction is delayed.
— And what should be done about this? What is the way out you see?
— It’s as if we are rebuilding our national energy sector from scratch every time. But first of all, we must decide on the main thing: what do we envision for our own economy? How do we want to appear in the EU—as an active player with our own position or as an observer country? This is not a question of one agreement or directive. These are dozens of institutional areas where Ukraine must be present as an active player.
— So we should work the way EU countries work?
— Exactly. In the EU, each country clearly knows its interests, weighs who will vote for what, and where a compromise will be found. And us? We often say, “it’s not the right time.” But how long can we live in a “let’s do it after the winter” mode? For many years, the country has been in a state of crisis, where decisions are made today for tomorrow. It is time to start acting strategically—calculating our interests and substantively defending them.
— Do we understand correctly: you believe that Ukraine needs more ambitious goals?
— Yes. Look at our European neighbors. Look at Poland, which already has a trillion-dollar GDP and is aiming for a place in the G20. And we are always on the sidelines. We need to regain our agency not only on the battlefield but finally set serious strategic tasks in the sphere of national energy and economy that correspond, first of all, to the national interests of Ukraine. And such a position is fully consistent with high-quality European integration, which is the fundamental choice of the Ukrainian people.
Ultimately, we must move from simply patching holes—buying new transformers or equipment—to high-quality, systemic management solutions. Without this, we are doomed to move from crisis to crisis, and on a downward trajectory.
The key task is to create a systemic culture of decision-making. We must develop a professional discussion and plan the development of energy and the economy in advance, not from one winter to the next.
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