15.12.2025
On December 15, 2025, Energy Club held an online discussion broadcast on YouTube on the topic: “The Role of the Ministry of Energy in Wartime: Leadership, Strategy, Responsibility.”
Ukraine is entering one of the most difficult heating seasons: energy infrastructure is under daily attack, and energy workers are operating in extremely difficult conditions to prevent a blackout. The participants of the discussion focused on issues of sector management in wartime, specifically regarding the absence of an appointed Minister of Energy, the fragmentation of decisions, and the lack of a clearly articulated long-term strategy for the restoration and development of the energy system.
Speakers:
Leonid Unigovsky, CEO of Naftogazbudinformatika LLC
Yurii Prodan, Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine (2007–2010), Minister of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine (2014)
Oleksii Kucherenko, Member of Parliament of Ukraine
Oleksandr Dombrovskyi, Vice-President, Head of Energy Innovations and Energy Efficiency of MHP, President of MHP Eco Energy, Chairman of the Board of the Public Union “Global 100% RE Ukraine”
Ivan Plachkov, Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Energy Assembly, Minister of Energy of Ukraine (1999), Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine (2005–2006)
Moderator: Maksym Nemchynov, Vice President of Energy Club, former Deputy Minister of Energy of Ukraine.
1) Absence of an Appointed Minister: Management and Political Vacuum
The moderator outlined the fundamental question: how does the absence of an appointed minister affect the management of the industry at the height of the heating season, and does the acting minister have sufficient political mandate and authority to responsibly navigate the winter? Speakers repeatedly emphasized that under the current configuration of powers and responsibilities, gaps in coordination arise between government bodies, state-owned companies, and other market participants.
2) Vice Prime Minister for Energy: The Need for a Single Center of Coordination and Responsibility
Leonid Unigovsky argued for the necessity of the position of Vice Prime Minister for Energy as a tool for constant interdepartmental coordination during war and reconstruction. As an example, he cited a list of tasks requiring the simultaneous participation of several ministries and agencies (energy, finance, economy, foreign policy, market reforms) and emphasized that one-off anti-crisis meetings cannot replace daily systemic coordination. He also outlined possible approaches to resolving the situation with the leadership of the Ministry of Energy: either the prompt appointment of a minister who has the trust of the professional community, or granting the acting minister a clear mandate for the heating season, subject to effective performance.
Yurii Prodan supported the thesis regarding the need for a Vice Prime Minister position combined with the Minister of Energy role, emphasizing that energy decisions in wartime must be made in a mode of constant management, not episodic headquarters meetings. He also drew attention to existing legislative mechanisms for special market operation regimes in emergency conditions, which, in his opinion, are insufficiently utilized.
Oleksii Kucherenko confirmed that he had raised the issue of creating the post of Vice Prime Minister for Energy in interactions with the government and within the “Anti-Crisis Energy Staff,” which has been operating since 2020. At the same time, he emphasized that in conditions of deregulation and liberalization, as well as the dispersal of responsibility among different institutions, the position must be held by a “figure of scale” and requires real instruments of influence. Separately, he highlighted the problems of market functioning, the role of the regulator, and the impact of PSO (Public Service Obligations) and tariff decisions on the financial stability of the system operator.
Oleksandr Dombrovskyi supported the need for both a professional minister and a powerful Vice Prime Minister, emphasizing that energy policy in peacetime and during war are different by nature, and the priority is the preservation of the energy system as a condition for the preservation of the state. He separately highlighted the personnel problem—the deficit of professional energy experts in the decision-making system—and the need to combine experience with modern technological solutions without a “monopoly” on a single technology.
Ivan Plachkov insisted that even if a minister is appointed, the role of the Ministry of Energy will not fundamentally change without changes to the system of powers. He emphasized the necessity of strengthening the management vertical, granting additional powers for the crisis period, and bringing order to the industry, particularly through effective regulatory and control mechanisms. Separately, he drew attention to the shortage of equipment (transformers, switches, cabling products), the issue of centralized reserves/procurement, coordination with local authorities, and the need for clear communication with the population regarding risks and winter scenarios.
3) Policy “Framework” for 3–5 Years and Recovery Strategy
Participants agreed that given the uncertainty regarding the duration of the war and the state of the energy system afterward, planning must combine:
Emergency repairs and physical protection;
Resource and financial discipline;
Preparation for post-war recovery and modernization.
Various assessments were voiced regarding quick “universal” solutions. In particular, the discussion raised questions about the content of the concept of “distributed generation,” its scale, manageability, and vulnerability to attacks. It was also emphasized that technological solutions must be integrated into a single system, taking into account war risks, available resources, and the needs of the economy.
4) The Role of Expert Councils, Supervisory Boards, and the Professional Community
Speakers emphasized that recommendations from the professional environment should become the basis for decisions, not a formality. The role of supervisory boards in state-owned companies, issues of responsibility and the efficiency of their work in wartime, as well as the need for clear “rules of the game” and accountability for results, were discussed separately.
5) Communication and Public Trust
A separate block of discussion featured criticism of insufficient communication regarding outages, forecasts, and system capabilities. Participants emphasized that people need working feedback channels, clear explanations of the logic behind decisions, and realistic expectations regarding the situation in the energy sector.
Moderator Maksym Nemchynov summarized the discussion with a proposal to prepare an appeal based on the results of the meeting (primarily to the Prime Minister of Ukraine, and, if necessary, to other authorities within constitutional powers) regarding strengthening the management of the energy sector in wartime conditions. The idea was also voiced to make such discussions regular, expanding the circle of professional participants and, if possible, involving international partners in the expert conversation.
Energy Club thanks the speakers and all broadcast participants. We will continue to work on consolidating the professional position of the industry and preparing practical proposals aimed at increasing manageability, resilience, and responsibility in the energy sector of Ukraine in wartime.
