13.11.2025
The winter of 2025 will be another test for Ukraine’s energy sector. The aggressor continues to attack critical infrastructure, with even the western regions of Ukraine, previously considered relatively safe, increasingly finding themselves in the crosshairs.
Under these conditions, the question of preparing for the cold season takes on special significance: how resilient is the energy system, and will there be enough resources to guarantee light and heat for citizens?
Following the so-called “energy truce” in the spring of 2025, approximately 3,000 strikes on energy facilities—both massive and localized—were recorded in just a few months. Not only power stations but also gas transmission facilities, substations, and distribution networks are coming under fire. The enemy is trying to paralyze not only generation but also the logistics of energy resources, particularly gas.
The strikes are timed precisely as the winter preparation campaign concludes. This repeats the scenario of previous years: damage to large stations and distribution networks is intended to create a power deficit.
At the same time, practice shows that even after serious shelling, energy workers restore supplies within hours or days.
In 2022, the country experienced the most massive outages, with blackouts lasting several hours in most regions. However, over time, damaged capacities were restored, and some of those considered damaged were brought back into operation.
The 2025 summer season showed the result of these efforts: despite regular attacks, there were no large-scale restrictions, even for businesses. Consumers in most regions did not experience interruptions, and outages in frontline and border areas remained short-term.
The Ukrainian energy system has learned to live under conditions of war: coordinated algorithms between Ukrenergo and oblenergos (regional energy companies) allow for the operational redistribution of loads and the activation of backup sources.
The Government is currently focusing on protecting critical infrastructure. In particular, UAH 630 million has been allocated from the reserve fund in the Zaporizhzhia region for the construction of protective structures around substations. This should ensure the stability of light and heat supply in one of the most vulnerable regions.
Another important initiative is the government’s program for the mass installation of individual heat substations (IHS) in buildings connected to centralized heating.
A modern IHS is a fully automated, compact complex installed directly in the building that regulates the supply of heat and hot water specifically for that facility. It receives heat carrier from the central network and, depending on weather conditions and consumption levels, adjusts the carrier’s temperature for transmission to the building’s heating and hot water systems.
Typically, an IHS is part of a comprehensive set of measures to improve a building’s energy efficiency. Its use allows for the rational use of thermal energy and reduces household costs. In turn, the supplier receives information from the individual heat substations and can adjust its own expenses and reduce the load on the networks.
Humanitarian and technical assistance from partners is a separate component. From Azerbaijan alone, Ukraine has received over 50 types of equipment—from generators to transformers. In total, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, over 23,000 tons of technical assistance have arrived from abroad.
The decentralization of the energy sector also plays a significant role. Hundreds of new solar, wind, and gas installations are already connected to the grid.
In Kyiv, for example, a three-level model of energy resilience has been created: from launching additional gas turbines and equipping boiler houses with generators to providing backup sources for thousands of residential buildings.
Examples of hospitals combining generators and solar panels with batteries prove that even in the event of prolonged outages, critical infrastructure can operate without interruption. This is not only a matter of security but also an example of savings and increased energy efficiency.
Today, Ukraine has generation reserves, as well as stocks of equipment, gas, and coal. In parallel, a long-term strategy is being formed: by 2030-2032, the country plans to phase out coal-fired thermal power plants (TPPs) and transition to a mix of nuclear, hydro, gas, and renewable energy with a powerful energy storage component. This will not only increase resilience but also allow Ukraine to enter the top five European leaders in terms of energy system cleanliness.
Thus, the country is entering the winter of 2025 with a different energy system than it had three years ago. It has been hardened by attacks, reinforced by international aid, and equipped with new technologies and local solutions. Mass outages are possible only in the event of extremely dense attacks on large TPPs, but a nationwide blackout scenario seems unlikely.
The combination of protective structures, modernization, international support, and the development of decentralized generation creates the foundation for resilience. And although the threat remains, Ukraine is demonstrating that it is ready for winter—with reserves, algorithms, and confidence in its own strength.
About the author:
Vadym Lytvynenko, Executive Director of NVP ENERGO-PLUS LLC. Born on October 25, 1975.
