12.01.2026
The Ukrainian energy system is under constant pressure—aerial attacks, a shortage of professional personnel and equipment, and complex, dangerous logistics.
However, alongside war risks, there exists another factor—less visible but no less dangerous: the debt trap. It erodes trust, “dries up” investment, and renders any conversation about rapid reconstruction hollow. Delaying solutions here means paying a higher price tomorrow.
Debts to producers of “green” electricity passed their peak in September 2024, reaching approximately UAH 35.7 billion. Over the year, this figure was significantly reduced. Yet, even after this, debt obligations for RES (Renewable Energy Sources) electricity remain substantial: as of October 2025, Ukrenergo’s total debt to the State Enterprise “Guaranteed Buyer” stands at UAH 16.1 billion.
Moreover, separate debts of UAH 2.1 billion accumulated during January-October 2025 alone, meaning it is too early to speak of systemic success in debt liquidation. For instance, in 2023, current payment discipline was nearly ideal (approximately 99%), but in 2024 it deteriorated, ranging between 89–95% monthly. Settlements in the current year were also unstable (77–99% across different months), leading to the formation of the aforementioned new debt obligations.
However, 2022 remains the primary “failure” period. Because the energy system operated in “island mode” and accounting was disrupted, payments for certain months dropped to 33–45%. It was then that the main bulk of the cumulative underpayment for RES electricity—exceeding UAH 15 billion—was formed.
The transmission tariff rate remains the main problem node. It does not cover the real needs of the “Guaranteed Buyer” for payments to RES operators. Currently, the NEURC (National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission) has decided to increase this tariff by 7.2% in 2026. Only time will tell if this will be sufficient to restore payment discipline in the “green” energy sector.
Add to this non-payments by end consumers and the sale of a portion of “green” electricity on the balancing market at discounted rates. This creates a persistent “cash gap” that pressures the energy market.
Consequences of failed regulatory decisions also persist. For example, the imbalance formula approved in 2021 artificially lowered payments for electricity under “green” tariffs. At the end of 2024, after lengthy consideration, this formula was judicially recognized as unfair. Consequently, the issue of recalculating payments for “green” energy for 2021–2022 is now on the agenda. This is fair, but it increases the total amount due for payment.
Until the autumn of 2024, 90% of international aid for the electricity sector went through Ukrenergo—grants and concessional loans for building protective structures, purchasing equipment, etc. Following governance scandals and the company’s technical default on Eurobonds, this channel has nearly run dry.
Aid has dropped significantly, and warehouses with transformers, switches, and cable fittings are not bottomless. When every large transformer costs millions and has long production lead times, a “hole” in financing quickly turns into a technical deficit. This is the origin of the “weak link” for the autumn-winter season: equipment and fortifications are needed now, not in an idealized future.
In November 2025, electricity imports grew by 15% (approximately 415,000 MWh), and Ukraine has been a net importer of electricity for the second consecutive month.
Hungary’s share in the total import structure is currently about 44%, flows from Slovakia have increased multiple times over, and flows from Moldova have doubled. Exports almost ceased as of November 11.
But the problem isn’t just about prices or resource availability abroad. Bottlenecks in our “West-East” grids prevent the full utilization of imports. Essentially, we pay more but receive less due to limited grid capacity.
The state has expanded the list of critical infrastructure equipment that can be purchased outside the electronic procurement system. Heat pumps, modular boiler houses, and connection nodes—this accelerates response times during peak periods and allows for building reserves.
A special gas price of UAH 19,000 per 1,000 m³ per year has been introduced for electricity producers in frontline regions. This supports CHPs (Combined Heat and Power plants), gas turbine units, and gas piston stations that balance peaks. The focus is on cogeneration, which provides both heat and electricity simultaneously and strengthens the decentralization of the energy system. These are correct steps, but they do not replace the main thing: restoring the financial logic of the market.
Thus, debt uncertainty has become a kind of tax on risk, which investors always translate into a higher cost of capital or a decision “not to enter” the market.
Without new investments, we will not build the 3.5–4 GW of maneuvering and decentralized capacities the country needs within a 4–6 year horizon. Without these capacities, we face a harder passage of consumption peaks, greater dependence on imports, and less system flexibility. Furthermore, this leads to the depletion of repair funds, postponed modernization, and higher accident rates.
Therefore, we must call a spade a spade:
It is now possible to formulate a step-by-step plan to normalize the financial state of the market.
Urgent Actions (up to 3 months) – Close legal “seams” and the cash gap:
Actions for 6–12 months – Restore accounting and financing channels:
Actions for 12–36 months – New payment model and maneuvering capacities:
Repaying debt is a signal. It means: the state acknowledges its obligations and is capable of fulfilling them. Following this, investment decisions accelerate, and the current cost of capital decreases.
Ukrainian companies that wait for payments will reinvest in modernization and expansion. Donors will see a clear mechanism and be ready to enter with targeted programs—for protection, grids, and equipment. The energy system gains resources for repair and strengthening, and the consumer gets fewer outages and more predictability.
Every month of delay is lost megawatts, a higher import bill, longer equipment delivery times, and yet another contractor re-evaluating risks and rates. Every step of the roadmap must have a date and a responsible party. Only then will tariffs cease to be politics, debts a chronic illness, and imports the sole insurance.
Ukraine has already proven it can hold the energy system together under strikes. Now it must prove that we know how to maintain financial discipline. Restoring lines is about engineering. Restoring trust is about rules. In a debt trap, the winner is the one who starts paying for the future first, rather than for the past.
About the author:
Vadym Lytvynenko, Executive Director of NVP ENERGO-PLUS LLC. Born on October 25, 1975.
