30.12.2025
Ukraine is importing record volumes of electricity from the EU, yet millions of consumers still sit without power for 12–16 hours or more. In other words, imports exist, but the lights do not. A logical question arises: where are the megawatts getting “lost”?
However, the paradox has a simple explanation: imports are not “light in a socket,” but merely an additional source of capacity. For electricity to reach a specific neighborhood or building, the main transmission lines, substations, and distribution networks must be functional—and that is exactly where the biggest problems lie today.
The issue is further exacerbated by the fact that, following massive shelling in early December, the capacity of Nuclear Power Plants (which constitute the base generation of Ukraine’s energy system) was reduced. According to IAEA data, grid damage led to the shutdown of some units or their transition to reduced power. That is why the topic of imports has been discussed so actively at all levels recently.
November already showed a systemic gap. Electricity exports fell by 94% compared to October 2025—to 5.3 thousand MWh—and have effectively stopped since November 11. Recall that in October, exports of Ukrainian electricity had already decreased by 85% compared to September. Imports, conversely, grew by 17%—to approximately 415 thousand MWh—reaching a maximum for the year.
Data for December is obviously not available yet, but it is clear that Ukraine remains a net importer of electricity for the second consecutive month. The supply structure has changed somewhat: Hungary remains the largest supplier (about 44%), as in October, but the shares of Slovakia (a 10-fold increase) and Moldova (a 2-fold increase) have grown significantly. At the same time, Poland and Romania have “sagged” in the structure of electricity imports.
From December 1, the maximum available import cross-section (capacity) was increased from 2.1 to 2.3 GW, but it should be noted immediately that both figures are currently more theoretical. After all, the average actual utilization of the cross-section in November was only about 27%, with peaks up to 88% during isolated hours.
Essentially, the resource exists, but not always where and when it is needed. We can identify the main reasons why even available electricity does not reach the end consumer:
In November 2025, the Ukrainian day-ahead market became one of the most expensive in Europe (with a price of about 140 EUR/MWh), while in Sweden, the price was approximately 36 EUR/MWh, and in France, for example, 43 EUR/MWh.
This is not about the “greed” of sellers and suppliers, but about the lack of cheap domestic supply and grid constraints.
The EU is strengthening cross-border flows—this lowers prices and adds flexibility. In 2024, France increased nuclear and hydro generation, becoming the largest net exporter in the region.
But even a record French surplus is not an automatic “magic pill” for Ukraine. The reason is the asymmetry of time and place: surpluses often arise during hours when we have a different load profile, and in nodes from which we cannot quickly “pump” megawatts.
Some EU countries also have electricity surpluses, especially during so-called solar and wind windows, and are also looking for places to sell the excess. But the same problems arise: complex logistics (both in the EU and within Ukraine) and load asymmetry.
In short, imports can be very useful, but they should not be viewed as a strategy to replace our own maneuvering capacity.
However, the operational picture is not hopeless. Ukrenergo expects a gradual reduction in restrictions as damaged facilities are repaired and in the absence of new attacks.
The government is synchronizing restoration, the construction of protective structures, the creation of fuel reserves, and the connection of cogeneration units to the network. This will add local capacity where it is most needed.
The effect of increasing the cross-section to 2.3 GW exists, but it is limited by internal nodes. The closest practical relief will come precisely from connecting decentralized sources and restoring networks.
In the coming weeks, the bet is on speed and precision. First and foremost, transmission capacities must be restored in critical corridors and nodal substations, where a single replacement of a transformer or breaker returns tens of megawatts to a city.
Mobile substations, field brigades, and “hot” equipment logistics—this is about hours and days, not months.
In parallel, it is necessary to connect cogeneration, gas piston, and gas turbine units to the network in deficit nodes. Where “black holes” of the evening peak appear on the map, local generation is capable of “picking up” the load.
In the horizon of a few months, the transition to managed demand becomes key. Industry and large commercial consumers are capable of “smoothing” the load under clear rules and compensation. This is not an abstraction: power limitation schedules (PLS) are already working, but they need to be transformed into civilized Demand Response (DR) programs with a predictable effect.
It is also necessary to continue creating additional “West-East” corridors, extra switching nodes in the 330-750 kV network, and local reserves around megalopolises and large substations. Energy storage units near major nodes support the system during 2-3 peak hours and reduce the duration of scheduled outages.
In the long term, game-changing capacities are required. 3.5–4 GW of new decentralized maneuvering generation is needed, located as close as possible to the consumer. Gas installations, cogeneration clusters for heat and electricity, and microgrids for critical districts—all this makes the system less dependent on one or two nodes.
Engineering logic must go hand in hand with institutional logic: transparent corporate governance, stable settlement rules, and rapid procurement of critical equipment. Without trust, there will be no funding; without funding, there will be no underground distribution points, reinforced interconnectors, or warehouses with reserve transformers.
Do not expect a magic button that turns off the outage schedules overnight. A realistic scenario is a gradual reduction in the duration and depth of outages in those regions where:
This is a “mosaic of solutions”: each piece alone does not save the situation, but together they produce a tangible effect.
Imports with a potential of 2.3 GW can be a temporary rescue, but by no means a panacea. As long as high-voltage lines and power transmission nodes are damaged, an imported megawatt will not turn into light in homes.
The path to shorter blackouts lies in three rapid actions:
In parallel, it is necessary to invest in our own maneuvering capacity and the development of central and local networks. Record imports are a symptom of an open wound. It is treated not by cross-section figures, but by the systemic rehabilitation of networks and the restoration of trust in the rules of the game.
