05.01.2026
Coal was talked about a lot in 2025—by some as a relic of the past, by others as a forced pillar of the energy system in moments of crisis.
The global market balances between record consumption and the inevitable retreat of solid fuel, whereas for Ukraine, coal is increasingly becoming less of an economic category and more of a military one.
Igor Chumachenko, Vice President of Energy Club, spoke about global and Ukrainian energy trends, the illusion of coal’s “return,” the real drivers of green transformation, and why 2025 became a year of a plateau rather than a renaissance.
— Mr. Chumachenko, what trends prevailed in 2025 globally and in Ukraine regarding coal?
— Coal is that character we’ve been ceremoniously escorting off stage for a decade to the applause of “green” energy… yet every season it returns in a new costume and pretends nothing happened.
In 2025, we learned that the world, imagine this, consumes more coal than ever before: according to IEA estimates, demand in 2025 reached about 8.845 billion tons—a new record.
But before you think, “Well, that’s it, coal is immortal,” let’s clarify. This isn’t immortality. This is inertia.
It’s like refusing to leave a toxic relationship because “we’ve been through so much together.”
Coal is exactly about that: the world’s energy systems aren’t ready to let it go everywhere just yet, especially when the weather acts up, grids can’t keep up, and electricity is needed always, not just on sunny days.
That is why 2025 is a year of a strange plateau: coal is simultaneously at a record high and doomed to a slow retreat. It is still needed, but increasingly not as a “king,” but as a substitute player on the bench who comes out for a shift when everyone else hasn’t managed.
— That is an interesting assertion, but quite controversial. Can you argue it?
— Indeed, on the global market, it looks as if coal is “in the game” again. But if you listen closely, you can hear that these aren’t fanfares, but rather the sound of an old engine that is still pulling but no longer enjoying life.
Who keeps coal afloat? Mainly Asia. China and India together account for the lion’s share of consumption—they are like two big trucks towing the market.
Why doesn’t coal “fall” immediately? Because an energy system is not poetry; it is harsh engineering.
The weather can be windless, hydro power can be weak, demand for electricity can be insane, and grids and storage are not yet where we want them to be. In such days, coal is taken out like an old jacket: not fashionable, but warm.
And Europe? Europe is indeed trying to abandon coal, but 2025 showed a characteristic thing: the decline in demand can slow down if there is less wind and water, and stable generation is needed here and now.
So, we don’t see breakthroughs in coal. But let’s look at how things are with “green” energy.
— Yes, I would like to hear your opinion on the main energy trends of 2025.
— Green energy in the world behaves like a person who suddenly decided: “starting Monday—a new life” and… actually started.
In 2024, renewables added 585 GW of capacity and provided over 90% of all growth in electricity capacity worldwide—this is no longer a hobby, but an industry with muscles.
The main “stars” are solar and wind: they accounted for about 96.6% of “clean” additions, and solar generation continues to grow the fastest (IEA expects about +22% solar PV output in 2025).
But this fairy tale has a domestic reality: to reach the goal of “tripling RES by 2030,” the world needs to grow by approximately 16.6% per year, and in 2024 it managed 15.1%—meaning we are running, but still wearing slippers.
Therefore, the second major trend is storage and grids: batteries are scaling rapidly (IEA notes that in 2024 annual storage additions exceeded 75 GW), because without them, RES sometimes resemble a genius friend who “will definitely come,” but won’t say when.
The third trend is a gigantic expansion of the horizon: IEA forecasts that in 2025–2030 about 4,600 GW of renewable electricity capacity will be added to the global energy system—a scale equal to the installed capacity of China, the EU, and Japan combined.
The fourth is a redistribution of influence: China isn’t just building the most; it sets the pace and price through the production of panels and batteries, and competition for supply chains and tariffs is becoming part of energy policy.
And finally, the main “adult” conclusion of 2025: green energy is already winning economically in many places, but it runs not into the physics of the sun, but into the physics of bureaucracy—grids, permits, balancing, and construction speed.
As you can see, the comparison of rates, plans, and investments in coal versus renewable energy is in favor of the latter.
— Let’s leave the international solid fuel market and return to our country. What happened with coal in Ukraine in 2025?
— If in the world coal is an economic character, then in Ukraine in 2025 coal is a military character.
Here it isn’t traded “for the best price,” it answers the questions “is it possible to extract at all” and “is there anyone to burn it.”
One of the tragic and most notable events is the Pokrovske Mine Administration. The stoppage of extraction at the “Pokrovska” coking coal mine can be described like this: not just a “mine,” but raw material for metallurgy.
In a normal world, this would look like “supply difficulties.” In the Ukrainian reality of 2025, it sounds different: “we lost a pillar, now we have to buy it from the outside, more expensively and nervously.”
A “millionaire” mine, which not only provided GMK (mining and metallurgical complex) enterprises with raw materials but was also a major taxpayer and employer, didn’t just stop. The mine and the beneficiation plant attached to it are completely destroyed. The same is happening with all industrial objects in other “liberated” territories.
“Krasnolymanska,” “Dobropillia Coal,” and other coal mining enterprises.
The Dobropillia hub in 2025 is an illustration that war hits a mine not as a “business,” but as a life support system underground. There were reports of infrastructure damage resulting in gas accumulation and flooding, as well as situations with power outages and people underground.
We need to discuss this like adults: electricity in a mine isn’t a comfort feature; it is oxygen. If there is no power, there is no ventilation or drainage. What follows is a chain of events no one likes to reread.
— Is it possible to replace the lost coal for the rest of the industry?
— When internal mines are torn apart by war, imports stop being “profitable/unprofitable.” They become “the only way.”
Ukrainian reviews record a strengthening role of external supplies and maritime logistics when corridors allow.
And here appears a new Ukrainian paradox: coal seems to be needed, yet it arrives “as it happens,” not “as planned.”
But we haven’t touched upon another important participant in the coal market in Ukraine. Coal isn’t just about “extracting.” Someone needs to burn it.
Ukrainian thermal generation has survived a “tragic” campaign in recent years. After massive attacks, a substantial part of generating capacities was destroyed or damaged (in separate statements by DTEK and Centrenergo, an estimate of approximately “90% of available capacity” was voiced).
So, in Ukraine in 2025, the coal chain looks like this:
Mine at risk.
Logistics at risk.
TPP may be destroyed or is being repaired under the threat of a repeat strike.
And here, even perfect imports don’t solve everything. Because you can bring the coal—but the “stove” where it should be put might be without a roof.
— And what is happening with coal among our northern neighbors?
— Against the backdrop of Ukrainian frontline reality, the Russian story seems “ordinary”: extraction, export, railway. But 2025 showed that Russia also has its own genre—a genre that can be called “logistical surrealism.”
The crisis isn’t that the world doesn’t need coal. The crisis is that the former model “extracted—sold—earned” no longer works automatically in that country.
In short, coal export in Russia is an exercise in “transporting coal in such a way that it costs more than it will be bought for later.”
Sounds like absurdity. But 2025 in that country consists of precisely such absurdities.
This led to the once-rich region of Russia—Kemerovo Oblast—suddenly becoming catastrophically unprofitable. The net losses of the Russian industry in the 1st half of 2025 were 185.2 billion rubles against symbolic values a year earlier.
What do we see here in 2025? Many mines have stopped. And those that worked, in many cases, were transferred to a reduced work schedule.
In 2025, the government of that country acknowledged the problem and reported on measures to support the coal industry (deferred payments and other decisions). But this is like morphine injections for a dying patient. Like the entire economy of Russia, the coal industry has become a hostage to the imperial ambitions of one person.
Well, let it continue that way.
— Name three key trends that will shape Ukraine’s energy agenda next year. What should business prepare for?
— In Ukraine, naturally, the main trend is the ongoing war. The situation at the front and the prospect of a peace agreement will be decisive for the entire country, not just for the coal industry and coal generation.
The global coal industry will live in the mode of “still holding on, but without fanfares”—and this is visible through three main trends.
First: demand is reaching a plateau and sliding down a bit: the IEA expects that after a slight growth in 2025, global consumption in 2026 will decrease almost symmetrically; while China might recover slightly and India might add, the drop in the EU and the US will pull the overall picture down.
Second: maritime coal trade is starting to “deflate”—a contraction is forecast in 2026, and flows are increasingly concentrating around Asia.
Third: economics is getting tougher—thermal coal prices are “normalizing” closer to early 2020s levels, while costs and regulatory/environmental restrictions are rising, so it is becoming increasingly difficult for high-cost producers to stay in the black, and the market is starting to weed out the weak.
At the same time, the division of roles within the industry is intensifying: thermal coal will increasingly feel the pressure of RES and grid limitations, while coking coal will still hold on due to steel, where, for example, India continues to increase consumption and diversify imports.
