05.06.2026
In a series of interviews and expert discussions, market participants, representatives of state-owned companies, supervisory boards, the legal community, and independent experts discuss practical aspects of managing strategic energy assets in the context of war, reforms, and increased requirements for transparency and accountability.
Olga Kosharna is an independent expert on nuclear safety and nuclear energy, a Candidate of Chemical Sciences, and in 2023 she was included in the Forbes “50 Female Leaders of Ukraine” rating.
In an interview with Energy Club journalist Olena Karpachova, she shared her vision of corporate governance at Energoatom, discussed the role of the supervisory board in a company operating under special legislation, outlined key challenges for the nuclear industry during the war, and explained why nuclear safety issues must remain the top priority when making managerial decisions.
– Ms. Olga, you have been commenting on the situation in nuclear energy and the work of NNEGC Energoatom for many years.– Ms. Olga, you have been commenting on the situation in nuclear energy and the work of NNEGC Energoatom for many years.
Speaking specifically about corporate governance, what, in your opinion, is the main problem of state-owned energy companies: political influence, weak supervisory boards, quality of management, lack of accountability, or the model of state property management itself?Speaking specifically about corporate governance, what, in your opinion, is the main problem of state-owned energy companies: political influence, weak supervisory boards, quality of management, lack of accountability, or the model of state property management itself?
– Actually, there are examples in Ukraine of successful corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in accordance with the OECD Guidelines. For instance, at NPC Ukrenergo, PJSC Ukrhydroenergo, and recently at NJSC Naftogaz.
As for Energoatom, we must start with the fact that on February 6, 2023, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted Law No. 2896-IX “On the Joint-Stock Company ‘National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom'”, which initiated the process of converting the state enterprise into a joint-stock company. Following this, Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1420 dated December 29, 2023, was adopted. By this decision, the state enterprise NNEGC Energoatom was officially transformed into the Joint-Stock Company Energoatom. This resolution approved the company’s charter, the regulations on the supervisory board of Energoatom, and the principles of its formation, since this company operates within the framework of special legislation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Law “On Corporatization” and these documents contain specific features of corporate governance for Energoatom, which were not being implemented.
According to the final provisions of the Law “On Corporatization…”, the company’s supervisory board was supposed to be formed “no later than 6 months after the adoption of the law,” meaning in August 2023. However, it was formed only on June 22, 2024! The violation of deadlines was partly due to the fact that the Government approved the relevant foundational documents by resolution only on December 29, 2023.
In my opinion, the actors of “Mindichgate” also contributed to delaying the formation and creating obstacles for the work of the supervisory board: I. Myronyuk – “Tenor” (at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada’s Temporary Investigating Commission led by O. Honcharenko, he publicly stated that he had been responsible for the corporatization of NNEGC Energoatom since 2022), and the minister-lawyer H. Halushchenko. By the way, after “Mindichgate”, a reboot of supervisory boards took place without complying even with formal procedures. Dismissing all independent members of all supervisory boards without reporting to shareholders is grounds for lawsuits. As an example, one can mention the president of Energy Club, Andrii Kostrytsia, who is successfully contesting his early dismissal from the position of a supervisory board member of JSC “Ukrainian Distribution Networks” in the courts.
That is, there is a fact of non-compliance with laws, primarily by the government. A similar situation occurred with the supervisory board of Energoatom. I know how it was formed for the first time; its state representatives included Vitaliy Petruk and Tymofiy Mylovanov, while my good acquaintances who meet all qualification requirements—very respected people who established the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate at the beginning of independence, including the two-time Minister of Energy Mykola Shteymberh—were filtered out at the first stage of the board’s formation by a recruitment company working with the Company’s money, while Energoatom officials interfered in the initial selection of candidates.
Another independent representative declined due to the duration of the approval and contract-signing procedure, resulting in only two independent members out of five on the supervisory board. This contradicts the corporate governance guidelines of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)—the international gold standard created to ensure transparency, accountability, and fairness in company operations. The supervisory board must have a majority of independent members.
Despite all this, Energoatom’s supervisory board did eventually start working. And all it accomplished was approving a new charter in August 2025, which stipulates seven members of the supervisory board instead of five, and dismissing the acting chairman of the board of NNEGC Energoatom, P. Kotin, upon his own request.
I must emphasize that Energoatom operates under special legislation. Therefore, all members of the supervisory board must meet the requirements of paragraph 6 of the Regulations on the Principles of Formation of Energoatom’s Supervisory Board, which specifies the mandatory requirement of having experience in the field of nuclear energy. However, the state representatives on the supervisory board formed in January 2026 lack such experience. One of them is actually a historian.
At its first meeting, Energoatom’s new supervisory board elected Rumina Velshi, an international expert on nuclear safety and regulatory oversight, as its chair. She previously headed Canada’s nuclear regulator, the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards, and the International Association of Nuclear Regulators. The company’s updated supervisory board consists of four independent members and three state representatives. Its composition includes:
The supervisory board supported Rumina Velshi’s idea to exempt the chairman of the board of Energoatom from liability for ensuring safety during NPP operations and from the requirement to obtain a license from the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate to perform organizational and administrative functions. From my own sources, I know that personally, the Minister of Economy, Environment, and Agriculture of Ukraine, O. Sobolev warmly supported this idea, despite objections from the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate, the Ministry of Energy, and even NNEGC Energoatom itself. And this is, first of all, an indicator of the state’s position, and secondly, a demonstration of the Government’s lack of understanding that this company operates under special legislation.
– Energoatom is a unique company: it is not only a major electricity producer but also the operator of critically important nuclear infrastructure.– Energoatom is a unique company: it is not only a major electricity producer but also the operator of critically important nuclear infrastructure.
Can a standard corporate governance model be applied to such a company, or does the nuclear sector require special rules that factor in nuclear safety and state control?Can a standard corporate governance model be applied to such a company, or does the nuclear sector require special rules that factor in nuclear safety and state control?
– Absolutely, only special rules. For example, economic results cannot be set as a KPI for the chairman and members of the board. After the Chornobyl disaster, a concept known as safety culture emerged. Nuclear and radiation safety must be the top priority over economic, production, and other goals. One cannot consider only economic performance to evaluate the board’s effectiveness. By the way, it is difficult to say how to set KPIs regarding safety.
I say this as a long-standing member of the Collegium of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine. In state regulation, I served in various capacities from 1996 to 2021—both as an external advisor and as a collegium member since 2005. Now I am simply an expert, a keeper of the institutional memory of the national nuclear and radiation safety regulator. But the highest priority for NNEGC Energoatom is safety. At the state regulation collegium, operational events at Energoatom’s NPPs were reviewed once a year, with a mandatory analysis of their root causes. Operational and radiation events at nuclear facilities are evaluated according to the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES). Its primary purpose is to promptly inform the public about the safety level and potential consequences of an incident. The scale is divided into 8 levels, the highest of which represents accidents on the level of the Chornobyl NPP or Fukushima.
The mandatory procedure for investigating such events is approved by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate. The primary causes of extraordinary operational events are the human factor, personnel error, deficiencies in organizational and instructional procedures, and equipment failure. Their ratio varies, but the vast majority of violations are linked specifically to the human factor. Therefore, for instance, setting the number of operational events as a KPI is impossible: how can this be measured for the chairman of the board or the general director of an NPP? This is a topic for discussion. I believe experts should be involved, but safety culture and the metric of reducing operational events throughout the year—this should be part of the KPIs, rather than economic results.
– Where should the line be drawn between legitimate state control over the nuclear industry and manual micro-management of the company?– Where should the line be drawn between legitimate state control over the nuclear industry and manual micro-management of the company?
Which decisions should remain with the state as the owner and policymaking body, and which should belong to the supervisory board and management of Energoatom?Which decisions should remain with the state as the owner and policymaking body, and which should belong to the supervisory board and management of Energoatom?
– First of all, I consider Rumina Velshi’s initiatives erroneous and even harmful because she encroaches on the state’s function, which is incorrect. Only Energoatom bears responsibility to the state, because the state appointed it as the operator responsible for the safe operation of NPPs. The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate must monitor how the company complies with licensing requirements, norms, rules, and nuclear safety standards. Therefore, the initiatives of the supervisory board’s chair exceed the board’s authority. The supervisory board should oversee long-term development plans, financial and investment plans, and analyze the feasibility and optimization of expenses, rather than interfering in the operational and licensing activities of the NPP operator.
There must be a realistic energy strategy based on Ukrenergo’s report analyzing the adequacy of generating capacity for the upcoming year and for 10 years. Approving an energy strategy up to 2050 right now, during a war—and secretly at that—is madness. After all, we have lost energy-intensive enterprises, population, and the consumption structure has changed. The composition of the supervisory board must ensure the possibility of objective, independent judgment. All members, including civil servants, must be appointed based on qualifications relevant to the sector of activity and the business profile of the enterprise, and they must bear legal liability, which we currently lack.
Unfortunately, the government does not comply with special legislation. According to the OECD guidelines, it can influence the company’s activities within the framework of state energy policy, but it cannot interfere in the distribution of powers between the chairman of the board and the director for nuclear and radiation safety—we already have the sad experience of Fukushima for these reasons, even though that disaster could have been avoided.
– You have repeatedly drawn attention to safety issues, facility protection, and managerial responsibility in nuclear energy.– You have repeatedly drawn attention to safety issues, facility protection, and managerial responsibility in nuclear energy.
How should responsibility for nuclear, physical, and infrastructure safety be anchored in Energoatom’s corporate governance?How should responsibility for nuclear, physical, and infrastructure safety be anchored in Energoatom’s corporate governance?
– Responsibility is defined by laws and regulatory acts—general safety rules for NPPs and orders of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate registered with the Ministry of Justice—all of which are mandatory for implementation at the state level. Regarding nuclear safety, the law explicitly defines what the operator is responsible for. Regarding physical protection, there is a law on the physical protection of nuclear installations. Regarding the protection of critical infrastructure, which includes open switchgears (OSG) located outside the NPP site but belonging to the NPP and responsible for power output—protecting the OSG is the duty of the NPP operator.
The enemy is currently hitting the second circle of Ukrenergo’s 750 kV transformer substations. Ukrenergo began building concrete structures around transformers according to a project agreed upon with the General Staff of the Armed Forces in 2023. And on August 2, 2024, I was at a meeting regarding energy with Herman Halushchenko and Andriy Yermak, and I asked whether such protective structures would be built at open switchgears. “No,” Halushchenko replied, “they won’t be hit.” I asked, “And who told you that?” – “Well, we reached an agreement.” Then the Kursk operation began, and they started hitting our infrastructure. In the Russian media, I read that an agreement had indeed existed, but due to the Kursk operation, shelling of the energy infrastructure commenced.
The tender for protective structures for NPP OSGs was announced in September 2024, and only now, in 2026, has a protective structure finally been built at a single facility, the Rivne NPP. Only at one. What is happening at the others, I do not know. The use of procurement funds is not my domain, but, for instance, this year there was an environmental impact assessment and construction of power units 4 and 5 at the South Ukraine NPP site. This amounts to 5–6 million UAH, small change for Energoatom, which has a turnover of 256 billion, but it’s the fact itself. And the supervisory board must also oversee these procurements. Because there were staggering things happening there, such as a 300% margin on first-level protection—sandbags. Certainly, NNEGC Energoatom must engage in protecting the critical energy infrastructure on its balance sheet, and first and foremost—open switchgears, which are responsible for power delivery.
– How effective can a supervisory board be in a company where a significant portion of decisions is tied not only to business but also to state policy, international obligations, military risks, and the nuclear safety regime?– How effective can a supervisory board be in a company where a significant portion of decisions is tied not only to business but also to state policy, international obligations, military risks, and the nuclear safety regime?
What competencies should the members of such a supervisory board possess?What competencies should the members of such a supervisory board possess?
– All competencies are specified in paragraph six of the Regulations on the Principles of Formation of NNEGC Energoatom’s Supervisory Board, and in my opinion, they are comprehensive. Given the military risks, Rumina Velshi’s proposal to exempt the chairman of the board of NNEGC Energoatom from liability for the safe operation of NPPs was strange to me. After all, not only last winter but in general since 2022, there have been many instances where NPPs operated in non-routine modes due to shelling.
Based on the lessons of 2022, Ukrenergo developed an algorithm to prepare NPPs for a missile attack. Capacity is reduced in advance so that emergency protection does not trigger automatically and shut down the power unit. Therefore, since the winter of 2022–2023, we have had no emergency shutdowns caused by shelling. However, due to the loss of key Ukrenergo substations or power lines, non-routine operation still occurs. And one must possess substantial NPP operational experience to prevent an accident with severe consequences.
Therefore, the experience of Ontario Power Generation (OPG)—the primary state-owned energy corporation of Ontario province (Canada), which produces about half of the region’s electricity, and which Rumina Velshi called a benchmark for Ukraine due to a similar energy balance and strategic development of safe nuclear and hydro generation—is completely unsuitable for us, especially under wartime conditions. We survived last winter thanks to nuclear energy, and the restrictions were because Ukrenergo lacked balancing capacities to connect everything that had been damaged—thermal power plants, etc. Thus, it was solely due to the high professionalism of nuclear workers that we endured, and we had no emergency events.
Right now, we need to realistically assess the state of our energy sector and understand that we will get through the next winter only thanks to base-load generation—nuclear power. Therefore, we are all interested in having nuclear power plants managed by professionals who bear full responsibility for nuclear and radiation safety under non-routine operational conditions.
– How, in your opinion, should the effectiveness of Energoatom’s management and supervisory board be evaluated: by financial results, production volume, safety status, procurement quality, implementation of investment projects, personnel training, or other criteria?– How, in your opinion, should the effectiveness of Energoatom’s management and supervisory board be evaluated: by financial results, production volume, safety status, procurement quality, implementation of investment projects, personnel training, or other criteria?
– The key performance indicators for the board of NNEGC Energoatom must first and foremost be safety. The supervisory board must oversee investment projects and their feasibility. Production volumes depend not on management and the supervisory board, but on the balance, which is compiled by Ukrenergo; thus, Energoatom will not be able to produce more due to dispatch constraints. And financial results are achieved not only by increasing electricity sales volumes, but also by optimizing operational costs.
– One of the sensitive issues for the nuclear sector is major investment decisions: completion of power units, procurement of reactor equipment, modernization of safety systems, and facility protection.– One of the sensitive issues for the nuclear sector is major investment decisions: completion of power units, procurement of reactor equipment, modernization of safety systems, and facility protection.
What corporate safeguards should exist so that such decisions are professional, transparent, and independent of political conjuncture?What corporate safeguards should exist so that such decisions are professional, transparent, and independent of political conjuncture?
– The completion of large power units during the war is out of the question. The supervisory board can approve decisions regarding the construction of small modular reactors (SMRs) on its sites with the involvement of private capital. The first project on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) is currently underway. This is a promising direction for nuclear energy. It involves building reactors with a capacity of up to 300 MW per unit. Their main advantages are high maneuverability (which helps balance peak loads) and enhanced safety due to passive systems.
In Ukraine, the implementation of SMRs is a priority for ensuring decentralized generation, replacing decommissioned coal-fired TPPs, and stabilizing the power system. The current development status of this area includes key initiatives and international partnerships. The thing is, we only have state ownership of nuclear materials. However, I know American investors who are ready to invest funds to build small modular reactors for their own needs, for example, at ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih. A similar opportunity is also being considered for the American company Dobra Lithium Holdings JV, LLC, which won the competition to conclude a production sharing agreement (PSA) for the development of the “Dobra” lithium ore deposit (Kirovohrad Oblast). In addition, similar projects are in DTEK’s plans. We need to accommodate private capital and allow the construction of small modular reactors—100 MW or 300 MW—on our sites that already have the infrastructure.
We have supply chains and the ability to buy not just any reactor technology; for instance, General Electric Hitachi has the most advanced project, which is being built in Canada, and contracts have already been signed with the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Poland. We should consider the Polish model, where the financing mechanism was worked out before the decision to build reactors was made: 30% from the state budget and 70% from loans from American and European banks. In our case, they announce construction, but there is no money. In other words, a mechanism needs to be prepared, and the most realistic one, in my opinion, is attracting private investment for small modular reactors, which can be built even during the war on the sites of destroyed TPPs.
These are small facilities for which appropriate protection can be established. What kind of investments can there be in the development of large nuclear power units when the state lacks sufficient funds for education, science, and supplying the army?
– In wartime, the argument is often made that due to security risks, the state must act quickly and centrally.– In wartime, the argument is often made that due to security risks, the state must act quickly and centrally.
Can war be an excuse for scaling back corporate governance standards in nuclear energy? Where, in your opinion, does the red line lie?Where, in your opinion, does the red line lie?
– If we adhere to the OECD guidelines and the 2006 recommendations on improving corporate governance, war is not an obstacle to maintaining corporate governance standards in nuclear energy. We must comply with our own laws and the OECD corporate governance guidelines, which Ukraine officially joined on April 1, 2026. This step solidifies European standards of transparency, accountability, and efficiency for state-owned enterprises. Implement them instead of imitating them.
Unfortunately, this entire reboot of supervisory boards is happening with violations. The government should not publicly demonstrate such legal audacity, as seen, for example, in the case of Ukrainian Distribution Networks, when the Ministry of Energy dismissed the entire supervisory board of JSC “UDN” on December 9, 2025. Five individuals lost their positions: two state representatives and three independent members, including Andrii Kostrytsia, the president of Energy Club. I publicly spoke out in defense of these people and emphasized that this cannot be tolerated.
– Nuclear energy requires highly qualified personnel, engineering continuity, and a safety culture.– Nuclear energy requires highly qualified personnel, engineering continuity, and a safety culture.
How should corporate governance factor in human resources policy, the professional independence of specialists, and the protection of technical expertise from political pressure?How should corporate governance factor in human resources policy, the professional independence of specialists, and the protection of technical expertise from political pressure?
– We have a scientific school for training specialized professionals for nuclear energy. These are the Kyiv, Odesa, and Lviv Polytechnics. In the nuclear energy sector, people usually work in dynasties. There is a scientific school to support expertise in materials science—for instance, the use of metals in nuclear energy—and there is the E.O. Paton Electric Welding Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Overall, there are many universities and research institutes, and we can exchange experience and create joint platforms, for example, with Poland.
And I wonder why there are still no such initiatives, because on the platform of Polish universities or research institutions of the Academy of Sciences, we could work together towards strengthening expertise in the field of nuclear and radiation safety using funds from Euratom, the European Commission, the IAEA, and other institutions.
The supervisory board has the authority to select the chairman of the board and board members through a competitive selection process, provided that the corporate governance guidelines are followed. But if two independent members have already resigned from Energoatom’s supervisory board, then it cannot be considered legitimate. It may have formal powers, but from the standpoint of the guiding principles, it lacks legitimacy because a clear majority within it must consist of independent members.
– Speaking of corporate governance reform at Energoatom and the state energy sector as a whole, what three changes do you consider to be of primary importance for increasing accountability, transparency, and trust in the management of strategic energy assets?– Speaking of corporate governance reform at Energoatom and the state energy sector as a whole, what three changes do you consider to be of primary importance for increasing accountability, transparency, and trust in the management of strategic energy assets?
– First: independent members should not be selected at the expense of the companies themselves, as is done at Energoatom. The government needs to establish a fund to finance the recruitment company tasked with selecting independent members.
Second: state representatives must also be chosen through a competitive selection process, in accordance with the guiding principles and the Regulations on the Principles of Formation of Energoatom’s Supervisory Board, approved by Government resolution on December 29, 2024. We supposedly had a competition; I know that 106 candidates applied for Energoatom’s supervisory board, including acquaintances of mine who worked in the nuclear industry, lawyers, and economists, but they did not pass the selection process.
And third: the elimination of political influence. Unfortunately, in Ukraine, there is always political influence and hidden management mechanisms.
The discussion surrounding corporate governance at Energoatom once again goes beyond purely organizational or personnel decisions. It touches upon a fundamental question: how to combine state control, international management standards, and the absolute priority of nuclear safety under conditions of war and high systemic risks.
As Olga Kosharna emphasizes, the effectiveness of supervisory boards and management in energy companies is measured not only by financial or production indicators but, first and foremost, by the ability to ensure stability, professionalism of decisions, and the prevention of political or situational interference in operational activities. It is precisely the balance between transparent corporate governance, the state’s responsibility as the owner, and real compliance with safety principles that will determine how resilient and trusted Ukrainian energy will be for internal and international partners in the coming years.
