Philosophy of Independence, Myth or Necessity?
In Ukrainian realities, it is often said that “absolutely independent state bodies do not exist.” What is the true independence of the Regulator during war and economic crisis, complete isolation from the state or the ability to make unpopular but economically sound decisions without fear of political pressure? Where is the line between independence and proper accountability?
National interests and requirements of partners, where is the line of compromise?
Is the involvement of foreign experts with the right to a decisive vote in the formation of the National Commission for the Regulation of Energy and Utilities of Ukraine a temporary fuse to restore trust and gain support, or a long-term model? How can Ukraine move from an external supervision regime to an institution that will be trusted by both Brussels and Kyiv?
Evolution or permanent “revolution”?
Why is almost every political cycle or industry crisis accompanied by attempts to completely “reboot” the Regulator? What mechanisms in the law should ensure the stability of the institution, the preservation of professional memory and the predictability of the rules of the game regardless of changes of governments?
The market dilemma, arbitrator or crisis manager?
The European model of the Regulator was created for stable markets with an energy surplus and competition. Ukraine operates in conditions of war, generation losses and deficits. What should be the role of the NEURC today, a classic arbitrator ensuring rules and competition (market coupling, gradual abolition of restrictions), or a crisis administrator with broader tools?
Vision 2030, Regulator of the Future
Energy is changing rapidly, decentralization, BESS, digitalization, data and algorithmic network management. If we write new rules for the NEURC today, what competencies and tools should the institution have in 5 years? How to enshrine in law a 21st century regulator capable of working with new technologies and market models?
