13.08.2026
Why a network of local energy hubs can reduce the impact of attacks — and why time is now the decisive resource
Hanna Pozdniakova, Director of RSE Group Ukraine
This summer, Ukraine’s power system once again went through periods of abnormal heat, when consumption rose sharply because of air conditioning and cooling.
To stabilise the system and prevent a large-scale return of outage schedules, the Ministry of Energy applied a combination of measures: higher imports, adjusted timelines for power plant repairs, maximum use of the available distributed gas generation, additional storage capacity and reduced consumption during the evening peak.
To my mind, this is a very telling example. The power system withstands peak loads not thanks to any single solution, but thanks to a combination of different sources and the ability to manage them promptly.
This is exactly the logic that will be critically important in winter.
Getting through individual summer peaks successfully should not create the illusion that the capacity shortage has been solved.
Speaking to the media in Belgrade on 8 August 2026, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Ukraine no longer has a single power plant that has not been damaged by Russian strikes. This does not mean that all of them are shut down, but it shows very clearly the scale of vulnerability of large-scale generation.
A security factor is added to this. In its latest assessment, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) forecasts that russia will step up strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure next winter and will try to exploit the shortage of interceptor missiles to increase pressure on Ukraine.
It is impossible to predict the scale and consequences of possible strikes. But the system can be prepared so that the loss of one large facility does not mean the simultaneous loss of power supply for a vast number of consumers.
This is exactly where distributed generation stops being merely a buzzword and becomes a practical security tool.
The International Energy Agency, in its roadmap for Ukraine, identifies distributed energy resources as one of the key ways to increase the resilience and flexibility of the power system. The logic is simple: local generation reduces dependence on individual large facilities and, accordingly, the system’s vulnerability to targeted attacks.
And Ukraine is already moving in this direction.
According to the Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories, more than 570 MW of new decentralised capacity has been commissioned in the municipal sector alone. International donors have confirmed the supply of 568 cogeneration units with a combined electrical capacity of 973.7 MW, as well as hundreds of packaged modular boiler houses and gas turbine units. Separately, the government has set a target of commissioning 1.5 GW of new distributed gas generation by the end of the year. At the same time, the additional need of the regions for equipment exceeds 500 MW.
For me, these figures are particularly telling. We already understand the direction; the key question now is speed.
Cogeneration units have naturally become one of the symbols of Ukraine’s new energy model. They are especially effective where electricity and heat are needed at the same time: in cities, at industrial enterprises, water utilities, hospitals and critical infrastructure facilities.
But a resilient local energy system should not be built around a single technology. What matters is the needs of the specific site.
In one case the backbone will be a cogeneration plant. In another, what is critical is a mobile source of generation that can be delivered and started up quickly once the main power supply has been damaged. For tasks like these, mobile gas and diesel power units remain relevant — especially for critical infrastructure, enterprises or areas where capacity has to be restored as fast as possible. As an example, the State Agency for Restoration procured 15 mobile diesel power units rated at 2,500 kVA, designed for rapid relocation across Ukraine and connection to a range of industrial equipment. They are container-type units mounted on truck chassis and equipped with power transformers for voltage adaptation and frequency converters to ensure compatibility with the parameters of the consumer’s grid.
In other cases, energy storage may matter more. BESS makes it possible to support critical loads, smooth out peaks, provide short-term reserve and increase the flexibility of the local system.
A separate and extremely important element is heat. Ahead of winter we talk a great deal about electricity, but a power outage very quickly turns into a problem of heat supply, water supply and the functioning of social infrastructure. Here, industrial heat pumps can be part of the solution for boiler houses, municipal facilities, hospitals, enterprises and other heat consumers. They make it possible to use electricity and low-grade or surplus heat efficiently and to reduce gas consumption. And here I cannot fail to mention a highly efficient RSE solution: heat pumps and chillers with a coefficient of performance (COP) of up to 8, an oil-free turbocompressor and the environmentally friendly refrigerant R290.
What is more, the same engineering infrastructure does not lose its relevance once winter is over. In summer, heat pumps and chillers solve the opposite task, namely providing cooling. For manufacturing, logistics, retail, the food industry or hospitals, cooling can be just as critical a resource as heat is in winter.
In other words, we need to move from the logic of “which equipment should we buy” to the question “which local energy system do we need to build”.
I am drawn to the concept of “energy honeycombs” — autonomous or semi-autonomous clusters in which critical infrastructure can keep operating even when the central grid is damaged.
Technically, this means that different energy solutions have to be designed not separately, but as a single integrated system.
For example, a local energy hub can combine cogeneration as the base source of electricity and heat, BESS for storage and balancing, heat pumps for efficient heat supply, chillers for cooling, and mobile or diesel generation as emergency backup.
All of this should be run by an automatic control system that decides which sources need to be brought online at any given moment, which loads are critical and where energy can be saved. If such a complex is designed properly (with the appropriate protection, automation, switchgear and sources capable of supporting the local grid), the site can switch to island mode. In simple terms: in the event of a failure, it disconnects from the damaged external grid and continues to supply electricity and heat locally to critically important processes.
This does not mean one hundred per cent energy independence under any circumstances. Nor does every enterprise or community actually need it.
The goal is different: to make sure that an external failure does not automatically shut down the entire site.
Equipment on its own does not solve the problem.
For a cogeneration unit to actually produce electricity in winter, it is not enough simply to bring it to Ukraine. It needs design work, site preparation, gas supply, electrical connection, a heat scheme, automation, protection and commissioning. The same applies to BESS, heat pumps, mobile power units and any other energy equipment.
That is why what matters now is counting not the number of units purchased, but the number of megawatts actually brought online and the number of sites able to operate autonomously. The state is simplifying procedures, financing the connection of cogeneration units and creating incentives for new generation. But there is little time left before winter, so the pace has to be accelerated as much as possible at the level of the state, communities and private business.
Especially where heat, water, healthcare, communications, production or another critical function depends on electricity.
Distributed generation should not be set against nuclear power, transmission grids or large power plants. Ukraine needs large-scale generation, strong grids, import capacity and physical protection of its facilities alike. But the war has demonstrated very harshly the drawback of excessive concentration: the larger the facility, the greater the consequences of losing it.
A distributed system works differently. It spreads the risk across hundreds and thousands of smaller energy hubs. An individual unit can be damaged too. But the loss of one local source no longer means the simultaneous loss of gigawatts of capacity. And a neighbouring community, hospital, water utility or enterprise can keep operating on its own generation. That is why I would see distributed generation as a reliable second pillar of Ukraine’s power system.
It does not guarantee that there will be no outages next winter. No one can give such a guarantee today. But it can substantially reduce the scale of the consequences of possible attacks: localise the damage, keep critical facilities running and give the power system time to recover.
The summer peaks have already shown that additional flexibility works. The task now is far harder: before winter begins, to turn individual successful distributed generation projects into a network of local energy resilience large enough to matter.
The technologies for this already exist. The main resource that is genuinely in short supply today is time.
